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This work employs John Dewey's cultural naturalism to explore how and why the
orthodox economic tradition functions as a religious faith. Scholars such as the theologian
Harvey Cox and others now view orthodox economic practice as a religion. Other scholars such
as Max Weber, Alasdair MacIntyre, and numerous others view modern economic practice as
exemplifying a particular ethic. A focus in this work are the destructive consequences of
practicing the Market faith. This work argues that much of contemporary economic practice
maintains a view of science that is incompatible with the kind of naturalism found in Classical
American Pragmatism. The history of the development of economics as a religious faith is
explored beginning in the seventeenth-century up to the present day. The philosophical
assumptions that have composed this relatively new faith are analyzed in detail. The conclusion
provides an account of what we may hope for in the future.

i

DEDICATION
This thesis is dedicated to Dr. Kenneth William Stikkers for his wealth of knowledge, patience
and assistance.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER

PAGE

ABSTRACT....................................................................................................................................i
DEDICATION................................................................................................................................ii
CHAPTERS
CHAPTER 1— Introduction................................................................................................1
CHAPTER 2— Rationalization and the Market God..........................................................13
CHAPTER 3— John Dewey’s Cultural Naturalism: A Method for Inquiry.......................28
CHAPTER 4— A Cultural Naturalist’s Critique of Orthodox Economic Science.............56
CHAPTER 5— Hope for the Future..................................................................................101
REFERENCES.............................................................................................................................117
VITA............................................................................................................................................125

iii

1
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The Harvard theologian Harvey Cox wrote an article in the March 1999 issue of The
Atlantic titled "The Market as God.”1 He claimed without reservation that our economic practices
and language are indeed religious. His 2016 book of the same name explicitly identities The
Market as a contemporary theology. The idea that market practices have been elevated to the
status of the ethical ideal is not new. Max Weber argued just that, and he proclaimed that the
spirit of capitalism had captured the hearts and minds of Western civilization to such an extent
that an inversion of values had taken place. Pope Francis in his 2013 epistle Evangelii Gaudium,
states that the market has been deified.2 Karl Polanyi's 1944 work The Great Transformation
propagates the idea that modernity is characterized by economic principles that are employed to
dictate social and individual life to an extent never before seen. He points to the unprecedented
fact that land, labor, and money themselves were all commodified and subjected to the laws of
the market in a relatively short period of transition.3 The sheer number of works, in a variety of
fields, that stress the apotheosis of the market is very high. Cox writes that "the phrase 'religion
of the market' is not just a figure of speech. Faith in the workings of markets actually takes the
form of a functioning religion, complete with its own priests and rituals, its own doctrines and
theologies, its own saints and prophets, and its own zeal to bring its gospel to the whole world

1

Cox, Harvey. "The Market as God." The Atlantic. March 01, 1999. Accessed July 27, 2018.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1999/03/the-market-as-god/306397/.
2
"Evangelii Gaudium : Apostolic Exhortation on the Proclamation of the Gospel in Today's World (24
November 2013) |Pope Francis."
https://w2.vatican.va/content/francesco/en/apost_exhortations/documents/papafrancesco_esortazioneap_20131124_evangelii-gaudium.html#No_to_the_new_idolatry_of_money. 3 Robert M. MacIver, foreword to
The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time. Beacon Press, 1957. 68
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and win converts everywhere. The fact that acolytes of the market faith do not formally
acknowledge it as a religion does not change this reality.”3
The Market seems to demand our collective belief. We know that we believe in The
Market because we seem to consistently act upon our beliefs in it. A vast number of our doubts
are quelled by belief in the principles of The Market.4 Many assert that The Market, with its
multifarious, immutable, laws, applies to every cultural context, thus asserting its omnipresence.
Many act as if the Market is simply the unfolding of static, unchanging, natural law, thus
assuming its omnipotence. Lastly, we seem to have agreed that The Market, in some idealized
form, will bring about a utopian equilibrium of goods and services, thus demonstrating a belief in
The Market’s eventual omnibenevolence. The goal of any rational society which assumes these
premises would have to be the preservation of this market as the highest good. Karl Polanyi went
so far as to say that we elevated the market faith to such an extent that "nations and peoples were
mere puppets in a show utterly beyond their control [market forces being the puppeteers].”5
The Market is the new utopian faith and it has ingrained itself to such an extent that it is not even
identified as a particular faith. The traditional religions have been generally displaced by the
"rational market” beginning with the transition to national markets during the eighteenth century.
The market and its laws have permeated social life and are treated as the pinnacle of enlightened,
transcendent, reason. The new "self" is inconceivable outside the context of "jobs,"
"productivity," "monetary value," "efficiency" and "competition." Time and space have been
transformed by this new faith and therefore our sense of what is possible has changed. If anyone

3

Harvey Cox, The Market as God Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016. 6
Peirce, Charles Sanders, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings ed. Nathan Houser. Bloomington:
Indiana Univ. Press, 2008. I am using "doubt" and "belief" in the manner advocated by Peirce in his essay "How to
Make Our Ideas Clear."
5
R.M. MacIver, introduction to The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic Origins of Our Time, Karl
Polanyi (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957,), xi.
4
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doubts the power of the market faith then they need only ask which beliefs powerful institutions
are willing to act upon. Economic considerations dominate what is socially possible, and it is
then suggested that economic forces have always dictated human life and always will. The
contention that the conditions describing social life today always have been, and always will be,
is the most blatant fanaticism imaginable, and yet it seems to be a generally agreed upon faith.
My proposal is to employ John Dewey's cultural naturalism as a method to explore how and why
the market is deified and to offer potential solutions to this problem using Dewey's general
approach. The use of ‘price’ as the quantitative measure of objective value is an example of what
Max Weber termed "rationalization," and from a cultural naturalist's viewpoint, this term
functions as a description of certain habits of thought and action that need to be explored further.
Dewey spent his life extolling a profound faith in human intelligence and creativity, and those of
us who want to perpetuate the classical American philosophical tradition ought to treat these
ideas as living and operative in our lives, not, however, as a set of maxims, but as an orientation
and approach to human life and the environments that sustain us. It would be contrary to
Dewey's cultural naturalism to suggest that it holds unflinchingly to a creed, but one theme that
runs through the whole classical pragmatic tradition is a staunch belief that human creative,
social intelligence can open up meaningful possibilities, and that our collective and individual
ability to vigorously push open the horizons of possibility in our lives is, indeed, sacred. That is
the assumption directing the goal of this work: to confront the market god as an obstacle to this
encouragement of human flourishing. The Market faith provides a comprehensive view of
humanity and nature that must be confronted in a way that does not merely preach, lambast, or
promise utopia. I aim to provide an analysis that is both a jolting shock to Market ideals and at
the same time a call for the imaginative exploration of what it means to live that shared
experience we call ‘civilization.’ Dewey, in my view, provides a canvas that helps illuminate the
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nature of what renders our lives significant. The task ahead lies in applying Dewey's insights and
critical method toward understanding and questioning the ideals of the Market faith.

The

esteemed anthropologist Clifford Geertz, who is sympathetic to Dewey’s project, defined
religion as “a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and longlasting
moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and
clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem
uniquely realistic.”6 This explanation helps to clarify what is meant by a "market religion."
Concrete examples that demonstrate the market's status as a theology are abundant. Everything
from corporate personhood, the economic assessments of the value of individual lives, the
proposed economic solutions to pollution and global warming, the ideological barring of
government intervention in the free market, the association of economic analysis with ’facts’ as
opposed to the normative, subjective values held by members of the public, the reduction of all
persons, places, and even some trademarked words and phrases, to the status of a commodity. As
we shall see, the all-important economic fact/value dualism has granted ultimate authority to The
Market, which begins to look like the most blatantly immutable ’fact’ of social life. The Market
is thought of as that causal force that functions as social arbitrator. The change in our experience
brought about by the apotheosis of The Market effects how we experience the world, and this of
course effects how we construct our purposes. The market's deification can be best understood
by providing some examples of this religion being practiced.
Take the example of the Ford Pinto and cost-benefit analysis as an instance of market
deification. Massive numbers of Ford Pinto's were recalled in 1978 due to concerns with the
safety of the car, and a number of deaths were reported due to the placement of its fuel-tank.

6

Harvey Cox, The Market as God. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2016. 256
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What is of note here is how Ford proceeded to handle the situation. Ford and other industries
now engage in what is called ’cost-benefit analysis’ in order to establish how much should be
spent on safety measures, thus assigning a price to the lives of their consumers and determining
the value of their lives using that method. A popular undergraduate economics textbook informs
us that an industry must assess the cost of implementing safety measures against the cost of the
loss of life that will result from not implementing those safety measures.7 If it is found that the
cost of incorporating the safety measures exceeds the cost of the lawsuits resulting from the
untimely deaths of their customers, then the industry should not incorporate the safety measures.
The textbook states that "the truth is that in a world of scarcity, we can't save everybody from
everything, so we have to make hard choices."9 This is treated by the text not as a normative
choice, but instead is a matter of calculating the facts of the matter and simply acquiescing to
those facts. To do otherwise would be deliberately irrational. The text goes on to claim that "the
only problem with cost-benefit analysis is the potential for numerical inaccuracy. It's a matter of
estimating probabilities via cost-benefit."8 I find it necessary to quote one more passage to
reinforce the ethic being conveyed. It is boldly stated that "another way Ford's cost-benefit
calculations can go awry is if the company uses an inappropriate value for what a life is worth,"
the implication of course being that a human life can be valued far too highly. Philosophically,
this is all very thin reasoning. It is essentially suggesting that price is, and ought to be, the
standard by which the value of a human life is measured. The notion of scarcity is used
constantly in economic literature and is so central that it will have to be examined later, but, for
now, we should note that a numerical value (price) is the standard used to assess the value of
human life.
7

Grant, Alan P. Economic Analysis of Social Issues Boston: Pearson, 2016. 40 9
Ibid. 44
8
Ibid. 44 Italics added.
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Yet another variety of cost-benefit analysis is used to determine the value of human life,
and it has been termed ’the lost-income approach.’ This approach attempts to estimate how much
the individual would have earned over the course of a lifetime had they lived. This approach is
used when there is a wrongful death or injury lawsuit with which a corporation has to contend.
Again, the corporation can simply compare the cost of implementing safety measures with the
cost of the number of probable lawsuits to come to a decision. These methods are justified
"because the court needs objective and measurable criteria for awarding damages. Whether you
like it or not, money is what matters."9 After all, you cannot deny the "facts." The life of a
twenty-six year old serial killer is, by this definition, far more valuable, from the perspective of
the all-pervasive market, than the life of a sixty year old nun who has devoted her life to serving
the poor, since the twenty-six year old has higher potential earnings in the case of his or her
wrongful death. This textbook goes out of its way to emphasize that, despite one’s initial
discomfort and misgivings, the conclusion the textbook adopts is simply a reflection of the facts.
Another example of The Market's deification can be found in its supposed solution to the
pollution and global warming crisis. It is argued here that market price ought to determine social
policy.12 The pollution issue can be broken down into four different processes. First, there is the
cost of searching for the aggrieved parties suffering from the polluting. Second, collectivization
costs are the costs accrued from the need for the community to pool their resources to
compensate for the losses the industry will sustain from cutting back on their polluting practices.
Third, negotiation costs describe the cost of hiring legal professionals to negotiate the terms of
the settlement between the aggrieved members of the community and the particular industry.

9

Grant, Alan P. Economic Analysis of Social Issues. Boston: Pearson, 2016. 48 12
Ibid. Chpt. 8 p. 6
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Fourth, there is the cost of monitoring and enforcing the industry to ensure that pollution levels
remain at the agreed upon amount. Government is ideally held responsible only for the
monitoring and enforcement costs. The text emphasizes that this is the "socially optimal
outcome." Socially optimal outcomes are those outcomes that cost the least to implement and
ensure the greatest production of wealth.10 The persons of the community are held responsible
for the monetary well-being of the corporate person. The textbook goes on to say that
"government action is required only if transactions costs preclude bargaining between polluter
and victim."11 If negotiation, collectivization, and search costs are too expensive for a
community to bear then, and only then, should government intervene. The private costs suffered
by the single industry are held in equally high esteem as the social costs suffered by the whole
community. Price assessment, yet again, determines how communities ought to function.
The cap and trade governmental policy is meant to compensate polluting industries so that they
can sustain the extra cost of cutting back on polluting. The goal with pollution problems is
always to prevent industries from having to "internalize" the cost of the "externality" that is
polluting. This "internalization" would of course not be the ’socially optimal outcome’ since it
would decrease the total wealth of the nation or community. The question of who benefits from
these savings is not the concern of the economic "benevolent social planner."12
Corporate personhood is the notion that corporations enjoy many of the same rights and
responsibilities as natural persons. Corporations enjoy freedom of speech as well as religion. The
socially constructed corporate person, which is somewhat a reflection of our own cultural desire
for the socially optimal outcome, supposedly based on undeniable, normativity-free, "facts"’ is a
symbolic reality that is legally regarded as fact. Corporate personhood makes more sense when
10

Grant, Alan P. Economic Analysis of Social Issues Boston: Pearson, 2016, Ch. 7, p. 30.
Ibid. Ch. 8, p. 8.
12
Ibid. Ch. 8, p. 9
11
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we consider that wealth creation is at the center of what is socially desirable in the eyes of the
market. The interests of natural persons cannot be allowed to override the corporate person's
interest in wealth-creation. That sort of normative preference would threaten the hegemony of
price as the fundamental fact and guarantor of optimal social outcomes. Corporate persons will
almost always be monetarily more valuable than any natural person, so the corporate person
possesses more objective value.
All of these examples suggest that government intervention is generally a sacrilege. All
human and natural resources must be employed in the service of efficiently allocating resources
in service of the socially optimal outcome. Wealth creation is the essential good. The text implies
throughout that economics is merely the measure of economic facts, while government is a
political, and thus normative, institution. Any distribution of resources driven by normative
concerns (the treasured values held by the community) is necessarily inefficient because it is not
dictated by market price. Government is therefore an impediment to the socially optimal
outcome. Thou shalt have no other god than Market Price!
If price is the objective fact upon which all social policies must conform, then all persons,
places, and things must have a price in order to be evaluated and directed, and all things of equal
monetary value are interchangeable. Universal commodification is the natural result of the
reliance on price for all determinations of objective value and, in no uncertain terms, this
contemporary undergraduate textbook implies incessantly that price is the only objective means
of determining how to proceed regarding any aspect of our experience thought to have objective
value. Take, for example, the idea that while the calculation of the employment rate is admittedly
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not a perfectly accurate reflection of the situation, it is still "completely objective.”13 The author
of the textbook may not have even meant to make such sweeping claims, but the logical result of
the distinctions and generalizations that it makes, function to provide this result.
Let us now turn to one other example of the market's deification that may not be so
obvious at first: the Financial Time's review of Harvey Cox's book The Market as God. The
reviewer only says one genuinely positive thing about the book, and, interestingly enough, it is
that "Cox’s project of examining the values and symbols of the market is a good one. It could
help yield a better understanding of how the capitalist economy works.”14 He goes on to say that
Cox inaccurately characterized orthodox economics as predominantly of the laissez-faire variety.
The entire book is said to be compromised by this misstep. Cox is not, however, interested in the
nuanced debates over economic policy and the relatively minor ideological differences involved
in these debates. The dominance of the market faith is so strong that many readers may miss this.
The Market as God is a work about an orientation toward the whole of life. The preoccupation of
the reviewer with which market policy Cox criticizes is a prominent example, from the
perspective of the thesis of the book, of the narcissism of minor difference. Cox is describing the
replacement of traditional religion with another religion that mirrors Christianity in fundamental
ways. He claims that the source of value to which we all refer has become the institution of the
market. It is totally irrelevant whether we accept the Keynesian heresy or ascribe to Hayek's
principles because the deification of the market remains.
It was the opinion of the Yale professor of law T.W. Arnold that the dominant figure in
"American mythology" is the "American Businessman." He boldly states that
The American Businessman was independent of his fellows. No individual could rule him. Hence,

13

Grant, Alan P. Economic Analysis of Social Issues. Boston: Pearson, 2016.
Ben-Ami, Daniel. "Book Review: The Market as God by Harvey Cox," Financial Times, 21October 2016. Accessed
July 25, 2018. https://www.ft.com/content/76d36f9e-8ee5-11e6-a72e-b428cb934b78.
14
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'the rule of law above men' was symbolized by the Constitution. This meant that the American
Businessman was an individual who was free from the control of any other individual and owed
allegiance only to the Constitution. However, he was the only individual entitled to this kind of
freedom. His employees were subject to the arbitrary control of this divinity. Their only freedom
consisted in the supposed opportunity to become American businessmen themselves...Every
demand on these great industrial structures is referred to the conception of the American
Businessman as a standard.15

The American Businessman described by Arnold are aptly understood as the saints of the Market
faith who exemplify proper practice. Arnold claims that "in this mythology are found the
psychological motives for the decisions of courts, for the timidity of humanitarian action, for the
worship of state's rights and for the proof by scholars that the only sound way of thinking about
government is a fiscal way of thinking.19" Arnold was one of a number of scholars who became
increasingly convinced that capitalism was most fundamentally a system of mythological,
religious symbols and habits. The idea of the Market God is by no means totally novel, but this
author aims to dissect the situation through the lens and operating tools of cultural naturalism.
Why should the deification of the market concern us? What is the real human cost of this
worldview? Why is this a severe problem? What does the idea of market practices as the summum
bonum look like when it is put into practice and operates in our lives? These are the questions that
need to be addressed. The critics of capitalism have done a marvelous job illustrating the
suffering incurred by capitalism since its very inception. It would require a separate work to
describe the complete toll in human suffering brought about by the wholesale adoption of market
principles for directing social action. A comprehensive analysis of this toll may not even be
practically attainable. Sociologists, philosophers, anthropologists, psychologists, theologians, and
many in other fields have unearthed the tragic narratives and experiences associated with the
beginnings of capitalism and its development very thoroughly, and this has often locked them
into a political battle with most of the economics profession.
15
19

Arnold, Thurman W. The Folklore of Capitalism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1937. 35
Ibid. 36
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The first chapter of this work will describe Max Weber's idea of rationalization and its
function as the practice of the market faith. I will argue that the market economy and the ’spirit
of capitalism’ are primary manifestations of the habits of thought and action characteristic of
rationalization. The beliefs that functioned to produce the medieval economy are vastly different
from the beliefs that propagate the market economy. This stark contrast will be elucidated in
order to reveal more concretely what rationalization is and the effects it has. Weber famously
used Benjamin Franklin to demonstrate rationalization in practice. Franklin's example contrasts
severely with past beliefs, and what we find in his pronouncements is the advancement of the
market to the status of a religious faith. Chapter One is intended to provide historical and
conceptual perspective on this topic. My interpretation of "rationalization" will come from the
standpoint of cultural naturalism, and I see Max Weber's analysis of this phenomenon as
compatible with this perspective.
The second chapter will provide a relatively condensed portrayal of John Dewey's
cultural naturalism and his method of inquiry. It would require an enormous amount of text to
argue for each and every one of Dewey's important conclusions. This remarkably extensive
treatment is not practical for the purposes of this text. Chapter Two will instead locate major
themes of Dewey's thought concerning "experience" in general, the process of inquiry,
communication, and to some extent democracy. Dewey's cultural naturalism is the groundwork
for all of the criticisms being leveled at the market faith. Dewey's thought is the antithesis of
rationalization, and his naturalism is not merely another "instrument" that can be applied to solve
everyday problems, but the fact that this can be done is to Dewey's credit and shows the real
force of his approach. His philosophy ultimately forces a normative decision upon the reader; a
decision regarding what is or is not possible for human beings to accomplish through
constructive participation.
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The third chapter will argue that John Dewey's cultural naturalism is an antidote to the
market faith. The Market God is the expression of an assemblage of beliefs and is the result of a
whole host of historically rooted philosophical presumptions. Dewey takes these philosophical
presumptions by the roots and extirpates them. A number of past economic thinkers will be
discussed through the naturalist perspective to show what sort of situation was being dealt with
and how the methodologies and conclusions constructed to contend with these problems were
misguided.
My conclusion will focus on why there is ground for hope in the future. I will criticize
utopian predictions and practices in favor of Dewey's approach. The market religion, it will be
argued, is an example of utopianism. Karl Polanyi was especially rigorous in showing why the
market economy is utopian, but I believe that Dewey's method offers a potential transformation
of our orientation to the whole of life that is so drastic that it topples economic absolutist
utopianism as a matter of course. Lastly, the tragic aspect of life will be briefly examined to
show that the market religion is merely an attempt to render meaningful our otherwise chaotic
lives. The fact that the market religion largely did not deliver on its promise of a rationally,
mechanically ordered, meaningful society does not entail that its ideals sought to subvert social
life.
We are organisms that live within environments that are meaningful to us, and we meet
our destruction when our environments are devoid of meaning. My thesis is that the market faith
is now sapping our ability to flourish in our shared environments. Let us now turn to
rationalization, those habits of thought and action that function as the practice of the market faith.
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CHAPTER 2
RATIONALIZATION AND THE MARKET GOD
Adam Smith did not think up principles by which the merchant and manufacturer gained power. He supplied them
with a philosophy after they had taken charge of the temporal government.16

Max Weber understood rationalization as the replacement of custom and tradition by
universal, objective, principles of reason. He meant this in a concrete sense, e.g., the change in
laborer’s attitudes towards wages, or the new behaviors amongst merchants and manufacturers
that focused intensely on profit at the expense of their old, established communal roles.
Rationalization also describes a relatively recent change in worldview that stresses a methodical,
calculated, stoical approach to life that prizes these virtues in monetary affairs as the highest
good. Weber highlights what he means by "rationalization" further by insisting that "labor in the
service of a rational organization for the provision of humanity with material goods has without
doubt always appeared to representatives of the capitalistic spirit as one of the most important
purposes of their life-work.17" Weber goes on to accurately state that the capitalist employs
"rigorous calculation" to achieve this "success.18" Weber finds rationalization to be irrational.
His argument is that rationalization has placed its maxims in the category of the unassailable a
priori. Rationalization as an end-in-itself is, it is argued, an inversion of the Western ethical
tradition. Weber uses the traditional, Greek, eudaemonistic notion of reason and virtue to
contrast with the new spirit of capitalism.19 Weber uses Benjamin Franklin as his primary
example to illustrate this inversion, but first the grounds for the historical development of
rationalization should be elucidated.
16

Arnold, Thomas W. The Folklore of Capitalism. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1937. 39
Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: The Talcott Parsons Translation Interpretations, ed.
Richard Swedberg New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009. 38 italics added
18
Ibid. 38
19
Ibid. 39
17
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It is my view that Weber was suggesting that the onset of modernity and rationalization
in Europe was a traumatic experience that left both the intelligentsia and the mass of people,
struggling to adapt to an environment whose explanatory edifice had completely collapsed.
Weber argued that there were a number of empirical social phenomenon that shaped modern
consciousness. First, enclosure dislocated people from their traditional roles and lands, thus
producing enormous numbers of "beggars and thieves.”20 Second, rationalization removed
Aristotelian teleological thinking so that calculation usually employed for the purpose of
accumulation quickly supplanted consideration of "natural ends." Third in Calvinism, with its
strict, severely methodical and stoic approach to ethical life, in combination with the anxiety so
obviously associated with the idea of predestination, there arose an immediate need to display
one's salvation by demarcating and distinguishing oneself via methodical strictness in service to
an ethical system. This ingrains a distinct quality to communal life. A frantic desire to prove the
elevated status of one's soul becomes a frantic pursuit for methodical strictness and calculation.
Fourth, Martin Luther's idea of "the calling" changed the social situation. Individualism was
promoted through the emphasis placed upon the individual's capacity to serve the divine by
finding the proper occupation. These beliefs are not only the result of a collective relation to the
means of production. There is a dynamic interplay between our ideals and technological change.
The specific social reality that developed was by no means inevitable.
The process of rationalization extends beyond what we now call the economic sphere and
is also an orientation toward experience in general. Economic life is simply the epicenter of this
orientation. The example of Benjamin Franklin's shows rationalization put into practice.

20

More, Thomas. Utopia. ed. and trans. Clarence H. Miller Yale University Press, 2001. 18-22 St. Thomas More
describes the process whereby livestock, especially sheep, take over the peasant’s lands, thus creating bands of
thieves and beggars.
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Franklin's moral bookkeeping is an example of an extremely methodical approach toward life.21
Franklin would devote himself to a single virtue each week to better his character. He drew up a
table to rigorously organize his development. What is of note is the planned, organized, and
somewhat severe nature of this approach to life. Franklin's moral bookkeeping prescribes to
future experience what is most significant and limits to some extent the horizons of what is
possible within situations. This rule-oriented approach "doesn't really allow us to grasp the
character of the moral agent, at least in any sense more profound than his or her 'reasoning' and
motivations at any given time.”22 Franklin’s moral bookkeeping obviously resembles the
development of the ethical demand for economic bookkeeping . Luca Pacioli, the father of
accounting, and Franklin share the methodical outlook, but Pacioli seems to have had different
ends. Pacioli centered his accounting work on a transcendent metaphysics in service to God,
while Franklin’s virtues are arranged in a methodical matter for the sake of efficiency as an end in
itself.23 Pacioli was deeply influenced by the Pythagoreans, hence the focus on the quantitative.
Pacioli and Franklin are separated by nearly two centuries, but the primary difference seems to be
that Franklin is not bookkeeping for the sake of upholding spiritual, metaphysical principles, but
is instead trying to maximize utility, which is in tandem with working toward accumulation for its
own sake. The contrast between Pacioli and Franklin helps clarify the meaning of modern
rationalization.
Weber focuses on Benjamin Franklin's sermon regarding the ethic of accumulation
because it reveals a novel view of the summum bonum that irrationally renders accumulation the

21

Weber, Max, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism: The Talcott Parsons Translation Interpretations, ed.
Richard Swedberg New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 2009. 22
22
Alexander, Thomas M. The Human Eros: Eco-Ontology and the Aesthetics of Existence. New York, NY: Fordham
University Press, 2013. 185
23
Pacioli, Luca. Particularis De Computis Et Scripturis: 1494. Translated by Jeremy G. A. Cripps. Seattle, WA: Pacioli
Society, 1994. Pacioli emphasizes the importance of theological notions in Chapters 1 and 2.
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transcendental end of all action.24 Franklin painstakingly provides rules for action that guarantee,
to the greatest extent possible, successful acquisition. Weber points out, almost always as a
shocking reminder to contemporary readers, that "a state of mind such as that expressed in the
passages we have quoted from Franklin, and which called forth the applause of a whole people,
would both in ancient times and the Middle Ages have been proscribed as the lowest sort of
avarice and as an attitude entirely lacking in self-respect.”25 This is not to inspire guilt, but to
awaken us to the very peculiarity of our common sense.
The process of rationalization was initiated within the context of what Weber termed
"traditionalistic business.26"Traditional business practices viewed work as a means for securing a
comfortable existence that allowed for ample leisure time. Money was generally spent relatively
quickly rather than saved as if it were an end in itself. According to Weber, the insecurities
brought upon the individual by the "Protestant ethic," and the simultaneous development of
bourgeois institutions and social relations, created a novel modus operandi amongst
entrepreneurs driven by an acquisitive ethic that was conceived of as evidence of God's grace. A
successful professional venture became evidence for the elevated status of the individual's soul,
and this view spread even more rapidly considering the breakdown of the mediating role the
Catholic Church had played between God and the individual's soul. The insecurity and instability
of this new relation to the divine drove an insatiable desire to find proof of salvation through
one's "calling."
Weber also draws our attention to the fact that these entrepreneur agents of
rationalization were not "economic adventurers" but "...above all temperate and reliable, shrewd
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and completely devoted to their business, with strictly bourgeois opinions and principles.”27 The
spontaneous enjoyment of life is not conducive to constant attention to business. Novelty is an
immediate threat to the regular, planned management of acquisition. This new entrepreneurial,
capitalist spirit permeates all of life. It is not merely a new instrumental strategy, but a purposeful
orientation. Weber bluntly states that "what is here preached is not simply a means of making
one's way in the world, but a peculiar ethic. The infraction of its rules is treated not as
foolishness but as forgetfulness of duty. That is the essence of the matter. It is not mere business
astuteness, that sort of thing is common enough, it is an ethos. This is the quality that interests
us.”28
Rationalization focuses on specific elements of experience at the expense of others.
Weber draws us to numerous examples of this concentration of attention. He insists that the spirit
of capitalism and the Puritan asceticism that partially inspired it, realizes a world where
to waste time is thus the first and, in principle, the worst of all sins. The span of life is infinitely
short and precious if one is to 'make sure of' one's election. To lose time through sociability, 'idle talk,'
extravagance, even through taking more sleep than is necessary for health (six to at most
eight hours), is considered worthy of total moral condemnation. Franklin's remark that 'Time is
money' is not yet found, but the proposition is true, so to speak, in a spiritual sense: it is infinitely
valuable, since every hour lost is taken away from work in the service of God's glory. Hence, passive
contemplation is also valueless, indeed in some cases actually objectionable, at least when indulged in
at the expense of work in one's calling29."

Temporality becomes a source of incredible anxiety when understood as a thing that can be
utilized or "wasted." This anxiety creates the need to compartmentalize as many facets of
experience as possible to designate which activities constitute "waste." Once the desirable
activities, and to some degree their consequences, are identified, all means can be procured
toward organizing and communicating those ends. Weber's above passage is enlightening
27
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because the compartmentalization that is called for is so severe and specific, and yet, it resembles
the contemporary capitalist "work ethic" to a high degree. The medieval world had a different
conception of economic activity, and this radically different perspective will help to identify
rationalization. Now that we are equipped with some of the basic characteristics of
rationalization, the contrast with the medieval and ancient world will be more apparent.

The

change in our conception of the spaces we inhabit is most marked when it is taken into account
that markets during the ancient and medieval periods had distinct boundaries.30 The time and
place for market activity was strictly controlled. Statues of Hermes could be found throughout
the Athenian agora, and this deity was intended to be the patron of both thieves and merchants.
The whole merchant class was generally held in suspicion. The medieval context saw the
introduction of the “fair.”35 The “fair” was a planned, politically controlled, event that usually
lasted over a month and involved long distance trade. It was forbidden for fairs to take place
within the local community or city. The fair was marked off from other social activities and was
a raucous occasion that was tolerated for political gain by feudal authorities. The market was still
a localized event that did not dictate other aspects of social life. The transition away from
feudalism required a change in the way local communities saw themselves in relation to their
neighbors, since the local community had traditionally been a center of political control and
cultural identity. Market activity in the past took place within a nexus of values that were deemed
more significant than market activity. Other values characterized what the market was and what
could be done. Profit, accumulation and efficiency were subordinate to the wider cultural
concerns. This historical context helps show the enormous differences that have come about due
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to the change in relations and attitudes toward the market. Our lived environments and
perceptions of others and ourselves, have changed drastically.
The difference between the spirit of capitalism and the Medieval world's interpretation of
the purpose of economic activity is remarkable. For example, the views regarding time are
incompatible. R.H. Tawney generalizes the Medieval view very nicely when he says,
But on the iniquity of payment merely for the act of lending, theological opinion, whether liberal
or conservative, was unanimous, and its modern interpreter, who sees in its indulgence to interesse
the condonation of interest, would have created a scandal in theological circles in any age before
that of Calvin. To take usury is contrary to Scripture; it is contrary to Aristotle: it is contrary to
nature, for it is to live without labor; it is to sell time, which belongs to God, for the advantage of
wicked men; it is to rob those who use the money lent, and to whom, since they make it profitable,
the profits should belong; it is unjust in itself, for the benefit of the loan to the borrower cannot
exceed the value of the principle sum lent him; it is in defiance of sound juristic principles, for
when a loan of money is made, the property in the thing lent passes to the borrower, and why
should the creditor demand payment from a man who is merely using what is now his own?31

I quote this passage in bulk because it reveals in detail the common economic perspective before
the process of rationalization took hold. It is a view that, whether justified or not, stands in stark
contrast to the spirit of capitalism. The market and acquisition in the medieval world was
obviously subservient to other values. Compare this medieval perspective with Franklin’s view
that “time is money.” If time belongs to a deity, and time is best devoted to that deity, then
equating time with money effectively displaces that deity. Franklin’s view of what nature
compels us to do is contrary to the medieval view. The medieval outlook is one of a complex,
interlocking hierarchy of determined ends that we ought to pursue. Franklin, on the other hand,
offers accumulation as the most obvious, natural purpose.
Thomas Aquinas' ideas are sharply contrary to rationalization. He understood a plethora
of passions as being fully real and emphasized that "not every moral virtue is about pleasure and
pain as its proper matter, since fortitude is about fear and daring...”37 These virtuous passions
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were deemed unquantifiable and so epistemologically useless by many in the modern period.
Aquinas believed that "the common good was the end of each individual member of a
community, just as the good of the whole is the end of each part.”32 Politically, Aquinas' thought
is utterly opposed to rationalization and its market god, since he believes that "to succor the
needy," which is associated with the passions of "mercy" and "pity," as well as being "liberally
beneficent" are essential to the practice of justice, which of course transcends price, or any other
kind of rational calculation, in importance33.
Aquinas rejects the concept of private property in favor of the idea that "man ought to
possess external things, not as his own, but as common, so that, to wit, he is ready to
communicate them to others in their need.”34 He goes even further by declaring that the rich man
"sins if he excludes others from using it [his external things].”35 The "laws" of the market are
subordinate to the practice of virtue. Aquinas argues that when those in need steal from those
who have a superabundance, it is not a sin but a necessity.36 The rich man is sinful for not
sharing, and the poor man is not sinful for taking what is needed. It is also permissible to steal
from the rich in order to give to a neighbor who is in need.37
On the subject of price Aquinas believed that "it is altogether sinful to have recourse to
deceit in order to sell a thing for more than its just price, because this is to deceive one's neighbor
so as to injure him.”38 All of the proclamations that Aquinas makes regarding price are
dependent upon the ethical situation of the buyer and seller. "Efficiency" does not supplant the
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importance of virtue. Usury is condemned "because this is to sell what does not exist, and this
evidently leads to inequality which is contrary to justice.”39 The contrast between the medieval
and modern view is most pronounced when Aquinas insists that "the just price of things is not
fixed with mathematical precision, but depends on a kind of estimate, so that a slight addition or
subtraction would not seem to destroy the equality of justice.46" This idea would later be
completely turned on its head. The idea of a market god with its devoted practitioners of
rationalization begins to become clearer in light of the contrast with Aquinas. The Market god is
no longer associated with traditional religion and has marked out territory of its own.
The spirit of capitalism has long since shed its religious influence, although there is still
interplay between capitalism and religious organizations. Weber informs us that, "in fact, it [the
capitalist system] no longer needs the support of any religious forces, and feels the attempts of
religion to influence economic life, in so far as they can be felt at all, to be as much an
unjustified interference as its regulation by the State.”40 This notion helps to explain why the
market is identifiable as a separate religion. The traditional customs that constrained the market
not only no longer exert much influence, but these traditional practices are thought to interfere
with the higher, objective, factual principles of the market.
The process of rationalization and the dawn of the spirit of capitalism occurred within a
context of incredible upheaval, and a revolution in thought and practice took place. Traditional
village life, and the whole conception of the world which fostered this environment, was cast
aside in such a swift and usually violent manner that we are still struggling to regain our footing
in this relatively new environment. Robert M. MacIver, in his "Foreword" to The Great
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Transformation, affirms this point by reminding us that "relentlessly they [the new class of
merchants and manufacturers] began to grind society itself into its atoms. Therefore men had to
discover society.41" A person who has lost nearly all sense of solidarity and belonging may
begin to question the existence of the external world, the possibility of having knowledge even of
loved ones, and may also cease to believe that the world is intimately, analogically connected,
but, instead, finds a world of discrete parts that, usually despite themselves, operate together in a
system which has not the slightest thing to do with normative considerations. Bernard
Mandeville's rationalized world in "The Fable of the Bees," for example, takes individual vice
for granted and he goes on to propose that the central task is to organize and plan social
institutions in such a way that these individual vices can be channeled toward productive ends.42
This is a whole worldview that largely dismisses the moral power of solidarity and the efficacy
of our attempts to develop virtue together. Individuals and their vices are prima facie facts, and
statesman must simply employ their Reason to mold a social machine that is oiled by the vices of
the actors.
For Weber, the "spirit of capitalism" and the "process of rationalization" are inextricably
linked. Weber uses the phrase "process of rationalization" when describing the annihilation of
traditional social bonds largely for the sake of acquisitive efficiency.43 Rationalization therefore
describes a movement away from time-honored, rooted understandings of ourselves, symbols,
and one another, in favor of much more "abstract," depersonalized relations toward persons and
things. The neoclassical economist Ludwig von Mises follows Bernard Mandeville's example
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when he says that "while under precapitalistic conditions superior men were the masters on
whom the masses of the inferior had to attend, under capitalism the more gifted and more able
have no means to profit from their superiority other than to serve to the best of their abilities the
wishes of the majority of the less gifted. In the market economic power is vested in the
consumers.”44 The intentions, values, personalities, and traditions of the capitalist have no import
here. It is the systematic organization of social and economic forces that make all the difference.
This is not a matter of whether or not Mises is "correct"; what is interesting are his premises and
methodology. Mises believes that "the fundamental principle of capitalism is mass production to
supply the masses.”52 The fundamental principle of capitalism may indeed result in mass
production, but it is fundamentally dependent on a whole legion of philosophical assumptions
that provide the fuel and traction for the process of rationalization. Economics merely provides
the most barefaced, extreme example of rationalization. Mises' contentions are the result of a
variety of influences. Mises, just like Mandeville, is interested in organizing desires and interests
to achieve the optimal social outcome defined by optimized consumption. The consciences of
individuals and their cultivation of virtuous habits is not considered. Mandeville and Mises have
a rationalized, mechanical view of social life.
It is worthwhile to note for the sake of historical clarity that Catholic social teaching has
been trying since the Middle Ages, and is still trying, to mount a defense against rationalization
and the unfettered Market God. The Jesuit economist Heinrich Pesch, in his work Ethics and the
National Economy, offered a stinging critique of the very notion that market principles ought to
direct and control the whole of social policy.45 Pesch strongly believed that virtue and moral
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development make our social lives possible, and this lesson he tried to impart to economics. The
idea of the "just wage," nearly forgotten in contemporary economics, was revived by Pesch.
Pesch had worked out an entire social and economic worldview that he labeled "solidarism."
Terms such as “private property,” “justice,” “charity,” “vocation,” and “usury” were revised and
given deep moral significance. He knew that these ideas could be changed de jure in accordance
with the solidaristic system, but de facto change would require an immense shift in social
consciousness. Pesch's example provides one amongst many retaliations against rationalization.
The common factor in all rationalistic thought and behavior, made explicit by scientists and
philosophers of the period after it was a social reality, is "mechanistic" thinking. Nature is
understood here as a machine governed by the laws of efficient causation. Society, being a part
of nature, was not exempt from this mechanistic reduction. It is hardly surprising that price was
latched onto as the proper measuring tool to be applied to the social machine given the desperate
need to make the new theoretical worldview function in some practical sense. This worldview
was permeated by the belief in the predictability, permanence, and regularity of nature. "The
concept of unchanging scientific laws, expressible in mathematical terms, was of particular
importance in this tradition and a mathematical approach came to be its dominant
characteristic.”46 The quantifiable abstractions of "a mathematical world in which speed, time
and distance were the only considerations" give us a fully rationalized world, and these
assumptions can be transferred to social life, with price being the quantity to be measured.55 The
mechanistic scientists and philosophers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries successfully
propagated their views and ultimately toppled all opposition. "It is only fair to say that by the
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nineteenth century, mechanism had itself acquired some of the intolerant characteristics of an
orthodoxy.”47
Even God was now a divine engineer tinkering with a machine. This was the opinion of
Rene Descartes, who found in this God the ideal of "power and truth rather than love and
goodness.”48 The laws of mechanics are now the laws of nature. "Descartes stripped away from
his view of the universe all that was extraneous to its mechanical functioning.”49 What was most
real were the mathematical descriptions of phenomenon. The objects themselves are rendered
interchangeable and mathematical relations became the only viable, objective, descriptive
accounts. A science of measurement, according to Descartes, "would surpass in utility and
importance all the other sciences, which in reality depended on it.”50 This denial of the
metaphysical status of qualitative experience would have serious social ramifications, and was
the method and habit of thought that gave intellectual weight and credence to rationalization.
Perhaps the most effective and all-embracing theoretical proponent of rationalization was
Thomas Hobbes. His "Leviathan" unambiguously brought the mechanical conception of nature
into the political sphere. "Hobbes is the first modern logician to grasp the significance of the
'causal definition.'51 Hobbes' epistemological position demands that "if one wants to 'know'
something, he must constitute it himself; he must cause it to develop from its individual
elements.”52 Knowledge is by these means transformed into the process of dissolution and
rearrangement, which always requires the imposition of the will upon passive nature. This
method must be carried into social life to be consistent; it is an analysis that "must not stop until
47
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it has penetrated to the real elements, to the absolute indivisible units.”53 This method proposes
an ideal method of inquiry that is not empirically verifiable or achievable, but the need to carry
out his atomizing principle drove this kind of inquiry and could not be questioned for the project
to come to any kind of fruition. The empirical reality of the family, culture, the state, and even
the individuals themselves had to be suspended for the process of investigation to ever begin.
Knowledge is derived from addition and subtraction, along with the abstraction necessary to
posit a mechanical, atomistic world. "In order to use individual wills as counters in his
calculation, he treats them as abstract units without any particular quality.”54
Hobbes and Descartes put into abstract theory the very social process that Weber
explained sociologically. The postulated social-religious, foundational unit of "price" runs
methodologically and epistemologically parallel with the metaphysical postulate of individual,
corporeal "units." The logical possibility of relations in general now becomes a serious problem.
The social result of this is that "rule and submission are the only forces which can transform
politically into one body that which by nature is divided, and which can keep this body in
existence.”55 Market price therefore cannot be usurped from its deified throne if the
"unitindividual" is to be measured for the sake of guaranteeing social cohesion.
Weber's sociological account is an explanation of how we found ourselves in such a
manifestly difficult situation. Aristotelian wisdom accepted at face-value that virtues such as
romantic or parental love were realities just as empirical measurements are. Weber, and other
thinkers who document the transition to the market's ascendency, find themselves describing
cultural trauma. This extension of the social contract, mediated and symbolized by market price,
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to the whole of life would strike ancient and medieval thinkers as pure barbarism. The "social
contract," based upon the aforementioned foundational principles, is a highly alienating
interpretation of experience. One need only consider the intimate relation of a mother to her
child, or the medieval view of the relation between the human and divine, to see the limitations
of such a contract theory.
The dominance of the mechanical theory of the universe is the metaphysical description
of a social scene where "it is a matter of course that capital, as the dominating principle of the
society identified by its presence, must color and infiltrate the institutions and beliefs that lie
beyond its immediate ambit of operation.”56 It is a society that sees in the laws of capital the
salvation of humankind.
We now turn to what is wrong with rationalization and why it is detrimental to human
flourishing. This has been touched upon in the Introduction, but this has been principally a
descriptive account of the contrasts between different worldviews in an attempt to elucidate
rationalization and devotion to the Market God. What we will find in what follows is that the
Market God demands sacrifice, human or otherwise. The consequences of rationalization are
most glaring and consequential in the field of economics, since this is, after all, a "market" god.
Cultural Naturalism cuts at the root of the market faith and denies that many fundamental
principles relied upon by economists are examples of scientific experimentalism. Instead,
economists have put forward foundational moral postulates concerning human nature, nature
generally, history and the ethical purpose of communities and individuals.
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CHAPTER 3
JOHN DEWEY'S CULTURAL NATURALISM: A METHOD FOR INQUIRY
Although our century has been preoccupied with the question of meaning, perhaps because so much of modern life
threatens to be meaningless, many of the dominant theories would have done well to begin where Dewey did and
think deeply about the nature of experience and the relation of human beings to the world before elaborating their
conceptual refinements57

It is important to bring cultural naturalism to bear on the problem of rationalization
because this philosophy offers the groundwork upon which we can understand how and why we
value what we do in fact value. Dewey's theory of experience shows us how we develop and
deploy our ideals, and his re-examination of what "experience" is and means can provide the
perspective necessary to orient ourselves to the world, and communicate with each other, in a
way that promotes all that we hold dear. Our hope should be placed in education and in our
ability to communicate our hopes and anticipate their consequences. I will show that the Market
faith prevents experimental inquiry. How cultural naturalism serves as an antidote to our present
ills is a question that will be addressed in Chapter 3. I will show how rationalization and the
Market God are problems from the cultural naturalist perspective. A detailed explication of
cultural naturalism will lay the groundwork for my critique of rationalization and our readiness
to sacrifice to the Market God. John Dewey is the central figure of this philosophical movement,
so his work will be the focus. Some of John Dewey's important ideas need to be elucidated
before rationalization's relationship to the Market God can be directly evaluated.
What differentiates Dewey and other cultural naturalists from the Western philosophical
tradition? A leading concern for the naturalist is the attempt to provide a descriptive account of
the "generic traits of existence." It is beyond the scope of this work to provide a detailed analysis
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of Dewey's philosophy as a whole. The investigation of communication, intelligence, habit and
democracy are the primary concerns here. However, to begin with these concerns without some
remarks on Dewey's foundational descriptions and postulates would be a mistake. Thomas M.
Alexander, in his upcoming work on Dewey's Experience and Nature, summarizes some of the
defining and distinguishing ideas advocated by Dewey. He states that,
In the second chapter Dewey begins his metaphysics of nature proper. After clarifying the
differences between philosophy as love of wisdom and metaphysics as the description of the
“generic traits of existence,” Dewey selects as his primary generic trait, “the precarious and the
stable.” He shows how for the most part Western philosophy has elevated one term, the stable (in
various characterizations, such as “being” or “reason”), over the other as designating what is truly
real. The result in the history of philosophy has been to turn an important distinction into a
spectrum of rigid dualisms. By treating the precarious as “equally real” as the stable—indeed as
inseparable from it—we can develop a functionalistic, event-oriented naturalistic metaphysics.
Nature includes the possible and the potential as well as what is actual. Dewey concludes the
chapter by a preliminary sketch of his own conception of Nature as a plurality of processes,
translating the mind/body dualism into ways of characterizing events.58

I cite this passage in full because it provides a wonderful account of what sets Dewey apart from
the prevailing philosophical tradition. Notice that Nature is now devoid of any assumed
ontological hierarchy of being. Nature is as it functions. The abandonment of foundational
dualisms between categories demands an empirically descriptive account of processes and
interactions. Biological functions are a kind of natural process that are no more or less "real" than
other processes. Communication through the use of symbols is no less "real" than the processes
described by the physicist. A preliminary look at our culture shows that there is still a tendency
to prioritize certain observable processes as the primary causes and determinants of other,
purportedly less ontologically fundamental processes. This mistake is made when there is any
effort to theorize about science as if there exist finished conclusions rather than a continual
process of inquiry.59 Economists, most obvious in the eighteenth and nineteenth century but still
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today, are guilty of relegating scientific conclusions to the status of finished products that can
then be used as eternal premises.60 The treatment of the stable as more causally fundamental in
the hierarchy of being than the precarious created an environment where reductionisms of all
kinds were not only likely, but nearly impossible to avoid. All phenomena simply had to be
attributable to some unchanging cause(s). "Rigid dualisms" functioned to provide room for
necessary causes of other, more precarious, natural processes that were, by extension, less
ontologically fundamental.
Dewey created what can be called a "conversational teleology," in contrast to Aristotle's
"narrative teleology.”61 For Dewey, form evolves by engaging the possibilities of a present
situation-- the way an ongoing conversation does. Some possibilities are close at hand, some
remote; some possibilities are more conducive to furthering inquiry by having been analyzed,
ordered, and directed in reflection. Inquiry would not take place if situations that needed to be
overcome to initiate further activity did not present themselves in our experience. We are not
given eternal problems to wrestle with a priori. Problems that obstruct our purposes and
activities, whether "hypothetical" or "practical," compel us to inquire as part of the natural
process of engaging within a lived situation. The consequences of this new approach have
profound implications both in philosophy and practical life. Absolute certainty is now an
impossibility in an environment that is always characterized by a degree of precariousness.62
But at each stage of our lived experience the field of immanent possibilities changes as form
takes one direction and closes off other possibilities. So, this is an open-ended teleology.
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Possibilities open up, or are made determinate, within lived situations. Possibility, as an abstract
universal concept, has no place in Dewey's metaphysics. Possibilities do not present themselves
all at once, and this entails that the concept of "possibility" cannot be eternally separated as a
category opposed to actuality. Possibility and actuality interact, i.e. function, in our embodied
experience as we physically and reflectively engage with an environment in specific situations.
Even the concept of "the environment," as opposed to the live creature, is incompatible with
Dewey's approach. There are environments, and these environments sometimes operate as
creatures who use symbols. The cultural sphere with its abundance of symbol usage is a kind of
environment that is wholly natural.
Dewey's open "conversational teleology" does not provide given fixed ends that are then
the grounds for further developments. Different "stages" of association are observably different
in a qualitative sense, but, of course, the qualitative and quantitative are not essential dualisms
either. These distinctions are operative tools that compel different kinds of behavior in a
situation. The value of John Dewey's empirical-denotative method lies in how it functions in our
lives. A reader who is looking for an internally consistent logical system that corresponds with
reality by building an argument starting with simple, irreducible, parts will be either befuddled or
disappointed by Dewey's philosophy, but this rationalistic approach is precisely the philosophical
methodology that Dewey wants to cast aside.
There are a wide variety of different schools of economics, just as there are a plethora of
metaphysical systems, that one could subscribe to. How are we to decide which internally
consistent system to adopt? One school of economic thought will build its premises from the
rationally self-interested individual, while another cannot imagine how one could not start with
anything but historically determined modes of production.
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Problems such as these demand a philosophy that makes sense of meaning,
communication, inquiry, and intelligence. Dewey argues constantly that the philosophical
tradition does not provide us with the tools necessary to handle communicative situations in
which there are fundamental disagreements concerning human nature or our experience in
general. An ingenious scholar in the Aristotelian, scholastic tradition would have had an
incredibly difficult time engaging in a fruitful debate with the new Hobbesian perspective during
the seventeenth century. These disparate groups often did not share the same fundamental
assumptions, vocabulary, or even, at times, purposes. The pendulum swung away from
Aristotelian scholasticism so completely that this worldview was abandoned almost wholesale.63
The method of science developed haphazardly behind the bars of a priori foundations. Dewey
encapsulates this difficult situation by noting that,
In the first place, the Aristotelian metaphysics of potentiality and actuality, of objects
consummatory of natural processes, was intricately entangled with an astronomy and physics
which had become incredible. It was also entangled with doctrines and institutions in politics and
economics which were fast getting out of relationship to current social needs. The simplest
recourse was to treat the classic tradition as the Jonah of science and throw it bodily overboard.64

Note that the "simplest course" was to abandon the classical tradition regardless of the
valuable insights that this tradition contained. This is, for Dewey, evidence of the fact that this
change was largely an historical reaction rather than an intelligent anticipation of consequences.
This is far from advocating that the new developments were somehow a mistake. I am suggesting
that the situation with economics today is somewhat comparable to the warring philosophical
camps that one would find in seventeenth century Europe. Social circumstances that present us
with an amalgamation of self-contained, systematic, incommensurate metaphysical systems to
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choose from leads to a general inability to communicate to overcome problems that inhibit
mutual understanding.
Dewey's whole career can be partially seen as a vigorous attempt to understand more
comprehensively processes of social change that have traditionally been disastrous and chaotic
reactions to abruptly changing circumstances that have brought about inestimable misery. He
proposed a method that could, if implemented, potentially enrich life and broaden our
understanding of ourselves and our environment. He recognized that, to come to this
understanding, a reconstruction in thought was necessary. Dewey's thought was therefore
centered on a moral imperative: the imperative to realize more of human creative potential by
enabling us to recognize the consequences of our beliefs by reevaluating how thought and action
function in our experience, thereby discovering more fully what thought and action mean in a
concrete sense.
One way to understand the profound scope and implications of Dewey's thought is to
explore what he means by "communication," "meaning," "intelligence," "inquiry," and
"democracy." Dewey's empirical-denotative method will become clearer while investigating
these important topics, and it will become clearer why Dewey's thought should be applied to our
market-centered social experience, and how his thought can help us understand our own purposes
and problems more thoroughly.
The first thing to emphasize is that communication, and the correspondence between
things and their meanings, does not somehow occur prior to human interaction. The difference
between the interaction of molecules and of communicative human beings is one of empirically
distinguishable quality. Human interaction through speech is no more or less "natural" than the
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movement of atoms.65 Speech and meaning emerge as qualitatively distinct and are different
kinds of interaction than other natural interactions. The idea that new qualities emerge as distinct
in our experience rules out the notion that we could apply the method of the physicist to come to
a full understanding of human communication and culture. The mistake made in the past has
been to assume that meaning is subjective belief in isolatable propositions and that
communication is merely the transfer of this subjective meaning to an object that could then be
socially demarcated and thus rendered mutually comprehensible.66
Dewey traces much of the current confusion regarding communication to the history of
our concept of "inner experience" and finds that it is a modern discovery that had not occurred to
the ancients as we understand it now.67 The problem is that the moderns retained the ancient
ideas of essence and form in altered guises and relegated these concepts to the purely subjective
realm, but "failure to recognize that this world of inner experience is dependent upon an
extension of language which is a social product and operation led to the subjectivistic, solipsistic
and egotistic strain in modern thought."68 A brief survey of commonly held beliefs, at least in the
Western world, and of much of contemporary philosophy, would suggest that Dewey's insight
here was somewhat forgotten or ignored.
Communication is thus not the mechanical transformation and interpretation of subjective
"sense-data." We communicate by imaginatively anticipating and sharing in a situation that
involves all the actors. The act of uttering a sound or of pointing is not the stimulus that compels
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us to act.69 These gestures and sounds do not exist as atomistic signs that we translate
independently. Instead, we take into account our temporality and recognize that it is our creative
capacity to anticipate the behaviors of others, in their full context, that allows our own thoughts
and actions as well as others to be meaningful. Communication is fully interpenetrative, i.e. it is a
temporal transaction wherein significance is creatively constructed through interaction.
"The heart of language is not 'expression' of something antecedent thought. It is
communication; the establishment of cooperation in an activity in which there are partners, and
in which the activity of each is modified and regulated by partnership."70 Dewey uses the broad
word "activity" here because communication conceived of outside of general interaction and
embodied behavior is a faulty account of communication. The creative act of coming to a
consummatory understanding occurs through the capacity to anticipate behavior by projecting
oneself within the other's situation.
Intelligence is the capacity to engage in the communicative activity just described, i.e. it
is the capacity to imaginatively anticipate consequences. Intelligence is therefore not an inherent
capacity pertaining to some individuals and not others; it is the result of consummatory
interaction. The term "consummatory" has a specific meaning for Dewey. It refers to those
experiences wherein there is an intensification of meaning. These experiences are identifiable
and have a rhythm that allows for the growth and development of meaning. Experience is
consummatory when there is union between the live creature and its environment. The
consummatory is not necessarily happy. It is an experience that can be recalled as significant.
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Note that “even such words as long and short, solid and hollow, still carry to all, but those who
are intellectually specialized, a moral and emotional connotation.71” These words are indications
of things in the world that first denote how we should behave and are not primarily cognitive
labels. Consummation is therefore not merely an instance of “knowing” propositions or
processes in the strictly epistemological sense. Consummation is lived. Consummation requires a
situation to be orderly enough to make some meaning of what is otherwise disjointed, fractured,
and in flux. If a situation is too ordered then its predictability and monotony renders the situation
meaningless. It is difficult to discern a rhythmic beginning and end within an overly monotonous
situation. Spontaneity and fruitful interaction are thus diverted.
Art, for Dewey, is the highest intensification of meaning in experience reflectively
expressed through some medium. Artistic activity "celebrates with particular intensity the
moments in which the past reinforces the present and in which the future is a quickening of what
now is.”72 Art is a selective culmination through expressive activity of consummatory situations.
Experience in the degree in which it is experience is heightened vitality. Instead of signifying
being shut up within one's own private feelings and sensations, it signifies active and alert
commerce with the world; at its height it signifies complete interpenetration of self and the world
of objects and events. Instead of signifying surrender to caprice and disorder, it affords our sole
demonstration of stability that is not stagnation but is rhythmic and developing. Because
experience is the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things,
it is art in germ. Even in its rudimentary forms, it contains the promise of that delightful
perception which is esthetic experience.73

This passage implies that our "senses" are not passive receptors of data because experience is
"the fulfillment of an organism in its struggles and achievements in a world of things." Our
whole bodies are active and participatory in the flow of perception, and, as was previously stated,
meaning is directly perceived. Cognitive activities ought not be divided into different "faculties"
for the sake of their ability to process "data" or the "manifold" without at once severing the vital,
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rhythmic, roots of all our interactions with the environment.74 We share with the animal kingdom
nearly every function; our exceptionalism, so far as we know, is found in our ability to do more
than act, react, and sense in a seamless way; we are busy "saturating it [experience] with the
conscious meanings derived from communication and deliberate expression."75 Experience does
not “begin,” as Hume believed, with the passive reception of “lively impressions.76”
“Experience” signifies the active tensions, releases, and struggles of the living creature. We do
not subjectively "experience" the sensation of unity with an environment. We experience that
unity. Dewey's descriptive account of experience, and experience's highest culmination in art, is
central to his whole philosophy, but Dewey does not reduce his other ideas about more
symbolically complex interactions to his theory of experience in general because his philosophy
is one of growth, adaptation, and association; hence there are no fundamental categories,
processes, or substance(s) that cause all other phenomena, or make phenomena possible, either in
a transcendental or causal fashion. We must simply keep in mind what "meaning" is in light of
this view of art and experience. The attempt to intellectually sever, rupture, or disjoin the
rhythmic flow of experience, inhibits the formation of meaningful associations, and this
severance leads to a greater sense of meaninglessness and isolation, with all of the consequences
that flow from that. This severance alienates us from those expressive artistic experiences of
unity. It is with this descriptive account of experience in mind that we move back to the issue of
communication.
Communication can either foster or divert consummation. If one cannot anticipate the
significance of what is being said and adjust one’s behavior accordingly, then there is no
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opportunity for mutual growth and understanding. Our use of words such as “individual,” “the
state,” “nature,” and many others have such a plurality of historical meanings that it is possible to
use these words without having the slightest hope for mutual understanding. The dictionary
definition is often unhelpful, simply because connotations can be different and the function of a
term varies in different situations. The Italian Fascists famously redefined “freedom” to such an
extent that it no longer had any resemblance to the traditional idea of freedom.77 These examples
of symbol manipulation have various explicit purposes, but they do arise from an environment.
Modern environments are composed of so many cognitive dualisms such as body and soul, spirit
and substance, freedom and determinism, form and matter, that symbols can be reformulated in
an ethereal dialectical performance, since this realm of the ideal has not had a connection
established in reflection with the way we do in fact experience the world. The dualistic
conception of fundamentally important ideas severs us from the very relations that sustain the
importance of those ideas. An idea (whether it has existential import or is hypothetical) that is
severed from the environment in which it had a clear function that indicated certain behaviors, is
no longer rooted in an organic purpose that was the result of a worthy adaptation. Imagine the
concept of "love," "fear," or "hope" as ideas separate from direct experience and then neatly
placed in solely linguistic, logically coherent matrices. These ideas quickly begin to hold only a
modicum of their original meaning. As symbols these abstracted ideas do not compel the same
sorts of behaviors as they once did. In fact, this division of the
"rational," "ideal," or "linguistic" from the realm of "sense data," the "manifold," or
"impressions" only denigrates and delegitimizes the ways in which we do experience the world.78
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Intelligence is cultivated by encouraging existential pluralism of these consummatory
situations. Individuals, indeed whole cultures, that are only engaged with limited situations,
objects, and individuals will have a much more difficult time assessing the consequences of their
actions and the actions of others due to their relative inability to adapt to cultural shocks and
unanticipated meanings that cannot be interpreted within closed and exclusionary methods of
inquiry. The flourishing of individuals and communities requires associational variety. If we
accept Dewey’s interactive, social theory of communication and meaning then we must reject the
idea that the solitary genius, or even a single set of principles, ought to be responsible for
cultivating intelligence. This would be equivalent to blundering haphazardly through existence
and hoping for spontaneous salvation for the very reason that it is not an adaptive orientation.
Social intelligence demands that we not only grow in our capacity to anticipate direct
consequences, but that we cultivate the depth and breadth of what we are able to identify as
significant, since this would enable a greater understanding of indirect, distant social
consequences. The lesson of radical empiricism is that the concepts we deploy to bring meaning
to experience are not constitutive of experience.79 New, emergent properties will forever
continue to surprise us. Intelligence is fostered by confronting experience in an open way that
allows for reorientation and adjustment.
The most intelligent approach to human life would include the recognition of the
centrality of meaning and value.80 The haphazard evolution of social structures, which is a
wholly natural variety of interaction, has resulted in tremendously disintegrated, fractured and
disjointed orientations toward existence. This is the central concern in Dewey's Art as
Experience. Dewey implies that without a deep sense of significance and value life becomes
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unlivable. Modern civilization has thus far largely failed to conceive of life as a search for
meaning because of the enormous stress laid upon transcendent, linguistic epistemic problems
that are isolated from what we experience as problems. Of course, meaning is not a "thing" to be
captured but is instead a social endeavor aimed toward deepening how we associate and inhabit a
shared space.
Those who are still seeking certainty regarding the most precious questions that confront
us must be disappointed that no precise definitions have been given to "meaning" or "value," but
I agree with Dewey scholar Thomas Alexander when he states that they "cannot be given precise
definition here, the kind cherished by analytic epistemology, for they are understood to denote
the richest and profoundest ways in which we exist. Quite simply, we seek fulfillment on a
number of levels and flourish when we find it and wither when we do not. A human life that has
been denied or stripped of love, friendship, happiness, creative work, curiosity, awareness of
mystery and beauty, and, above all, hope, has been destroyed."81 Meaning is determinate and is
comprehensible within an environment, but as a general abstraction, devoid of active and
participatory connection with an environment and relegated to an ideal, cognitive sphere, we find
that the concrete significance of the term is lost. The assignment of a strict definition to
"meaning" would be an implicit denial that meaning is denoted in and through the aesthetic,
which is the most unifying sort of activity between the person and its environment. "qualitative
and qualifying situation is present as the background and the control of every experience."82
What we can say is that, for Dewey, "meaning was to be understood as the symbolic use
of biological gestures toward the end of coordinating social action. The individual needed to be
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able to take a social standpoint or perspective in order to interpret himself.”83 Meaning is an
emergent level of interaction that cannot be reduced to the biological functions that make it
possible. Culture and meaning emerge as different kinds of existences than biological interaction.
Dewey's "principle of continuity" establishes that novel levels of interaction emerge from
previous ones. This does not suggest that a metaphysical principle is developing, guiding, or
commanding what new forms of interaction emerge. It is a descriptive, empirical account based
on the principle that we should refuse to deny our primary, pre-cognitive experience by inserting
our conceptualizations as somehow being the true causal reality of our experience. This
necessarily restricts the meaning of experience and closes possibilities that could otherwise be
left open.
This leads us to the notion that our experience is largely not an experience of "knowing."
The experience of knowing, and of verification for the purpose of discovering truths, is
something that happens in experience, but it does not constitute our experience. We sometimes
inhabit situations that demand verification, and there are then subsequently emergent "truths."
"Communication relies upon the pre-reflective context of social action which lends itself to
natural articulation and thereby also makes possible a vast refinement and development of
symbolic activity itself."84 The pre-reflective, or what Dewey calls "primary experience," is the
context of feeling that is potentially reflective. The shared life-world wherein social life takes
place is the medium where communication takes place. The dualism of the immediate and the
mediate is not a description of eternally distinct categories. The principle of continuity promotes
the idea that meaning is developed from situations that are aesthetic and historical. "Feeling" is
not a static category, but is informed by past behaviors and anticipated consequences.
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Communication progressively renders us self-conscious by actively engaging us in a
shared symbolic world. We are able to reflectively isolate distinct meanings for the purpose of
directing behavior. Habit, as has been said, is also central for Dewey. What the cultural
naturalists provide with this new view of habit is an opportunity to move away from the idea that
"each object in the external world carried its nature stamped upon it as a form, and that
intelligence consisted in simply inspecting and reading off an intrinsic self-enclosed complete
nature. The scientific revolution which began in the seventeenth century came through a
surrender of this point of view.”85 A virtuous habit for pre-scientific individuals is therefore the
ability to orient oneself in a way that consistently reiterated and reaffirmed the essential, fixed
nature of a thing. The evolutionary, temporal perspective fundamentally alters this view. To
know a thing is now to describe complex matrices of interconnections that are in a constant
process of development. This is why it is such a constant challenge to know; it is not simply a
matter of identifying and labeling changeless categories. One of Dewey's central points is that if
we fail to apply this insight to moral problems, then we will consistently fail to understand social
life more fully. It is not that ancient epistemology was wholly false. The issue is that it was so
restrictive, and it provided barriers to the growth and expansion of relations and hence meanings.
This examination of communication and meaning enables us to look at a new
understanding of "habit." Habits are not merely tendencies developed by each separate individual
in vacuo. Instead, "customs persist because individuals form their individual habits under
conditions set by prior customs.”86 This is not a deterministic insight but a recognition that the
culture in which we grow is a biological fact which we need in order to thrive just as we need the
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sun. The assumption that the habits that constitute our identities are individual inventions or
ingrained "essences," irrespective of context, is empirically as fallacious as the geocentric model
of the solar system. It is useless to assert that the individual is the precondition for society, first,
because it devolves into the kind of dialectical metaphysics that quickly abandons the novelty of
empirical reality for the fixity of definitions, and second, because we observe that no human
being could physically persist without association with some form of established culture.
So much of the confusion regarding our ideas on habit derive from our propensity to
separate thought from habit.87 Thought is sometimes conceived of as the disembodied
deployment of the distinct faculty of reason. Habits are then only the results and outcomes of our
lack or abundance of reason. This separation has the consequence of crippling our capacity to
employ thought in action. Thought disconnected from habit becomes a separate realm of
hypothesis incapable of being practically tested.88
Dewey applies these insights to economics and finds that "critics of the existing economic
regime have divided instincts into the creative and the acquisitive, and have condemned the
present order because it embodies the latter at the expense of the former. The division is
convenient, yet mistaken. Convenient because it sums up certain facts of the present system,
mistaken because it takes social products for psychological originals." 89 Psychological
reductionism of this kind denies the theory of habit just discussed because it ignores entirely the
historical, developmental, constantly operative nature of habit. Instead we are given an isolated
cause, such as greed, as a sufficient explanation for complex social behaviors.
What is inquiry, given the theory of communication, intelligence, meaning, and habit that
have been illustrated? Dewey's theory of inquiry describes a method to attain socially established
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ends. Inquiry does not begin unless a situation is "problematic," i.e. the situation frustrates,
obstructs or diverts our purposes. Inquiry is therefore a function in our experience. Every
inference involves a habit of thought. "When these habits are noted and formulated, then the
formulations are guiding or leading principles. The principles state habits operative in every
inference that tend to yield conclusions that are stable and productive in further inquiries.90"
These principles are still hypotheses that attempt to garner specific consequences. Dewey is
employing what he terms the "principle of the continuum of inquiry" which is an application of
the more general "principle of continuity" to the problem of inquiry. This principle of the
continuum of inquiry accounts for how an indeterminate situation becomes cognitively
determinate, over time, through selective attention to some purpose.
Leading principles conceived as categories removed from temporal development and
human purposes, describe a priori categories that, while supposedly guaranteeing certainty by
emphasizing permanence, fail to account empirically for scientific practice and experience in
general. Methods of inquiry are continually being modified to best suit problems that are
apparent. A successful inquiry that secures desired ends informs how inquiry ought to be
conducted in the future. "As the methods of the sciences improve, corresponding changes take
place in logic.91" Our experience informs how we inquire, and the meaning of inquiry itself can
change. The idea that logical inquiry provides a fixed picture of the structure of reality presents a
much different understanding of ourselves and the world than a belief that inquiry is adaptive and
respondent to changing environments and the resulting changes in the meanings of problematic
situations.
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This interpretation of inquiry readily lends itself to a whole vision of the significance of
democratic culture, and it cements the notion that all inquiry is communal and normative. In his
work Pragmatism and Democracy, Dmitri N. Shalin states that " democracy is an embodied
process that binds affectively as well as rhetorically and that flourishes in places where civic
discourse is not an expedient means to be discarded when it fails to achieve a proximate goal but
an end in itself, a source of vitality and social creativity sustaining an emotionally intelligent
democratic community."92 Democracy is not a Kantian end-in-itself but is simply the most
conducive social arrangement and set of ideals yet devised to ensure the enrichment of human
life through consummatory communication and the resulting deepening and expansion of
meaning in cultural life.
Democracy is not only a set of institutions, but a way of living. This way of living is
being thwarted today by what Naoka Saito diagnosed as "the sense that one cannot articulate
one's feelings or even that, in the loss of one's own taste, one does not know 'what one really
wants'" and that "the weakening of the personal sense of being is tied up with the loss of a sense
of the common good in the public realm.9394" The market ideal, for example, is not a personal
sense of being, but a force conceived of as external to, yet in many ways determinative, of
individual life. The obstruction of communication sets in motion a situation wherein an
individual becomes lost within social forces that obstruct the cooperative growth of meaningful
social practices. "Organic" social life for a cultural naturalist is defined as that social arrangement
which acknowledges the centrality of temporal interaction in all human behavior. A refusal to
acknowledge this instills stultified social habits that are the result of underdeveloped degrees of
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cooperation and interaction. The usual social response to such ossified circumstances is a release
of confused, inarticulate frustration that does not know what it wants and is simply a reaction to
situations wherein the sharing of meaningful experiences is obstructed, diverted, or dissipated.
Discussions of freedom, equality, fraternity, and participatory government are all notions
that can only be comprehended adequately within the context of even more primary social
purposes. The Italian fascists justified much of their behavior by inverting the meaning of much
democratic terminology.95 This twentieth century tragedy puts on full display the need for clearly
defined descriptions and purposes that situate our most cherished ideals, or these ideals will
become the playthings of sophists who may or may not be concerned with how their linguistic
inversions function as consequences in human life. Dewey is adamant that no individual can
fully realize herself when conceived solely as a locus of inherent freedoms from various social
bodies. Our freedoms flourish and develop through an oftentimes painful process of cooperation.
We have seen that our very self-conception is a product of creative interaction, but this idea of
the self is not compatible with a notion of the self that is defined as a categorically separate
bastion of freedom, a castle of freedoms being assaulted by the assumedly despotic hordes
outside its walls.
This "rugged individualism" that relies so heavily on an empirically faulty view of the
self, and depends on freedom understood solely in a negative sense, will invite extreme reactions
from a variety of sources because of the desperation for meaning felt by isolated selves.96 Dewey
could be misinterpreted as suggesting that the goal of human life is greater control of social
consequences, or that the ultimate task is the improvement of scientific methodologies. These
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misinterpretations especially ignore Dewey's work A Common Faith, where Dewey makes clear
that the processes of growth, adaptation, and adjustment are, in the last analysis, the spiritual
engagements of a social self that is rooted in a place.97 To suggest otherwise would entail that a
grid of fully rational, deterministic, certain principles can, or should, replace the pluralistic
wonder, indeterminacy, and mystery that has been so important to human experience throughout
the ages.
The cultural naturalist's account of democracy does not pretend to provide certain
principles to establish democracy's final authority and legitimacy. However, we can mutually feel
the consequences of the meanings that we assign to the most significant aspects of our lives.
Social organization is significant precisely because it can encourage us to anticipate creatively in
the inner-lives and behaviors of others, thus informing our own responses and identities. The
question is what to do in light of the consequences of the past. I do not use the term "nihilism"
because it can be interpreted as an essential metaphysical truth about the human condition
generally. The sense of nihilism (which does seem peculiarly modern) is the result of the way in
which human beings are participating in social life. Metaphysical nihilism is just as faulty a
perspective as metaphysical, rationalistic absolutism. Both of these perspectives consider the
journey of the intellect to be complete and that our task is then to contend with that fundamental
reality. The cultural naturalist's embrace of democracy is an explicit rejection of this finished
"block universe."
The meaning of science has often been misconstrued, resulting in the conclusion that
science is nothing more than a means to break facts into their component parts for the purpose of
passively observing a more fundamental reality that exists outside of any human purpose. Any
view that rigidly separates facts and values leads to this misconception. Science is properly
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understood as a method of coordinating activity to secure the means to accomplish socially
established ends. The method of science is a socially cultivated array of habits. The cultural
naturalist does not believe that there can be science without democratic habits. Dewey termed the
democratic, scientific orientation "experimentalism.”98 The key to Dewey's view of science rests
on the analysis of experience just given, and this view can be appropriately summarized as a
view "that experience means experienced things; that all philosophic conclusions are to be drawn
from the things as experienced (not from the concept of experience, which I have held to be
purely empty excepting as indicating a method of procedure and recourse); that things are what
they are experienced as, or experienced to be, I have asserted."99 This statement is crucial
because it counters the accusation that Dewey maintains that the only things that have "reality"
are those things that have been experienced. Of course, this claim dismisses the fact that we
project and anticipate consequences. We imaginatively construct situations and their
consequences. Dewey's thought looks forward at the hypothetical and possible rather than strictly
backward to what has been experienced.
There is usefulness in the distinction between "physical facts" and "human purposes."
"An occurrence is a physical fact only when its constituents and their relations remain the same,
irrespective of the human attitude toward them."100 A brief survey of our current social scene,
while impractical to assess here, shows that the tendency to err falls on the side of interpreting
social relations and their consequences as physical facts. Whole institutions and minutely
specific human behavioral trends are often analyzed without any thought being given to human
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purposes. These supposedly "factual" social events become a series of disconnected propositions
without any purpose to unify them and render them intelligible. We are left spinning amidst these
random facts without knowing how they relate to our purposes.
The building up of social science, that is, of a body of knowledge in which facts are
ascertained in their significant relations, is dependent upon putting social planning into effect. It is
at this point that the misconception about physical science, when it is taken as a model for social
knowledge, is important. Physical science did not develop because inquirers piled up a mass of
facts about observed phenomena. It came into being when men intentionally experimented, on the
basis of ideas and hypotheses, with observed phenomena to modify them and disclose new
observations...Imperfect and even wrong hypotheses, when acted upon, brought to light significant
phenomena which made improved ideas and improved experimentations possible.109

All inquiry involves purpose and planning. Removing the role of human purpose after coming to
a conclusion is a fallacy. The charge is often made that this reduces all conclusions to relativism,
subjectivism, and thus obscurity. Any accusation like this assumes a number of postulates
regarding human experience. First, this charge assumes that human purposes are fundamentally
outside of "nature," so that our tampering with facts is an intrusion upon the epistemological
purity of what we are attempting to analyze. It is possible to assign human purposes to
occurrences where this is unwarranted, e.g. the desire for a measurement to be one number to fit
a purpose, while in fact the result of the measurement was not compatible with that purpose.
However, this is an opportunity for adjustment and reorientation rather than proof that our
purposes are "subjective and internally constructed" maxims imposed upon "objective and
passive" nature. Second, it assumes that the intellect is the active agent which reads and records
the facts (or form) of nature while nature is the passive object (matter) that presents an
amalgamation of facts to be molded and acted upon. We have already seen that this dualism is
unfounded. Third, this charge divides the moral life and its preoccupations from the activity of
the understanding or intellect, thus preventing organized assessments of the consequences of our
purposes.
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Science and art are not essentially separable. "The practices of the arts were in turn the
source of science, when once the empirical methods were freed in imagination and used with
some degree of freedom of experimentation.”101 All inquiry is imbued with the esthetic, as the
esthetic (this is Dewey’s spelling of “aesthetic”) is the vitality of rhythmically fulfilling
experience. This was illustrated in detail previously. The divorce of the practice of science from
other varieties of artistic practice only accentuates the intellectual wall that has been erected
between the "intellect" and the "passions." Our practices reify continually this arbitrary division,
and we go on to wonder why so-called "nihilism," or the problem of meaning, continues to haunt
us! We must make our purposes explicit when studying social relations, or the facts accumulated
will serve whatever various whims happen to interpret the mass of conclusions waiting to give us
social direction.
"Common sense" and the scientific attitude are not the same, and this distinction helps to
clarify what the scientific, experimental orientation actually is. To say that they are not the same
only implies that the common sense and scientific dispositions are different adjustments to
different kinds of problematic situations. Of course, no situation is entirely a "common sense"
one or a "scientific" one. A common sense world with all of its inquiries belong to a kind of
approach to behavior. The common sense environment involves "problems of use and
enjoyment" as well as "activities and products, material and ideological, (or 'ideal') of the world
in which individuals live.102" The scientific orientation is adopted when knowledge is sought for
its own sake, apart from its application in acquiring immediate enjoyments and uses. The
justification of the terms "theoretical" and "practical" is found in their functions as designating
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these two kinds of behavior (the common sense mode of behavior and the scientific). "Common
sense...applies to behavior in its connection with the significance of things.103" The scientific and
common sense orientations are suited to different kinds of situations. It has been generally
believed since the beginnings of modernity that common sense is arbitrary and "qualitative"
while science is "quantitative" and also a system of necessary connections. The domain of
science and its quantifiable, necessary relations is separated from culture and the passions which
direct that domain under the intellectualized scheme. Logic seems to work differently when
engaged with science or common sense. However, "the question, summarily stated, is that of the
relation to each other of the subject-matters of practical uses and concrete enjoyments and of
scientific conclusions; not the subject matters of two different domains whether epistemological
or ontological.104" It was noted previously that inquiry would not occur if situations did not arise
that inhibit action, so it follows that scientific problems are developed from within concrete
common sense problems. Scientific conclusions are then reintegrated into common sense "in a
way that enormously refines, expands and liberates the contents and the agencies at the disposal
of common sense.105" Scientific activity is an orientation and a stage in the activities of life that
are response to felt problems.
There is never a fully isolatable scientific problem or object. Every situation, including a
situation in which scientific activity is taking place, is composed of multifarious phases, aspects
and components. A situation is a field of meanings and as well as possible and actual impulses.
We concentrate our attention on specific problematic objects because they have relative
importance and meaning within an environment. Attention to everything at once would make
action impossible considering our temporality. Besides, experience does not present everything
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at once, but rhythmically.106 We only designate as "cognitive" those objects that we are not
currently using as functional tools for securing enjoyment or use. Cognitive objects are only
understood as such because they are thought to be objects of knowledge rather than as signs
directly demanding a certain behavior. The mistake that is often made is our tendency to consider
this object of knowledge as an eternal and unrelated thing.
The meaning of quality "is not anything that can be expressed in words for it is
something that must be had.”116 Words are capable of pointing out aspects of the relations that
have their own qualities which are parts of the inexpressible feeling of the whole. We can
designate a thing as generally horrifying, but we cannot express in words the quality
"horrifying."
These observations have drastic consequences for the practice of science. On the one
hand, we should not be looking for an internal essence or definition of an isolated thing. Also,
the drive to separate the esthetic from scientific practice for being "subjective" is unwarranted,
since this accusation is based on an artificial dualism and is observably false. This reflective
division can have the result of cultivating sciences that either "... amass facts tirelessly and yet
the observed 'facts' lead nowhere. On the other hand, it is possible to have the work of
observation so controlled by a conceptual framework fixed in advance that the very things which
are genuinely decisive in the problem in hand and its solutions are completely overlooked.107"
Either the split between the theoretical and practical becomes a rigid, systematic rationalism or
an attempt to analyze an infinite array of facts that cannot be touched by human purposes.
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Almost never shall the practical and theoretical meet in this circumstance in the minds of those
engaging in inquiry.
The thrust of Dewey's philosophy of science is aimed toward emancipating the social
sciences, including economics, "in exactly the sense that would clear away misconceptions about
ourselves and our arrangements and empower us to reconstruct the social world more in
accordance with our wants and aims.”108 All too often the social scene appears as a confused
mass of data or of individual moral shortcomings, and contemporary experience has shown that
neither of these initial observations have much bearing on coming to useful conclusions in social
science. The situation is so bad that "the prime condition of a democratically organized public is
a kind of knowledge and insight which does not yet exist.”109 Democracies cannot rely on the
aims and plans of enlightened technocrats, nor can we have faith in a self-correcting social
mechanism. "Citizens need to understand what was happening and why...in the absence of a
widely shared understanding of the 'forces' at work, no democratic public could emerge.”110
The division of inquiry into a plethora of specialized branches has had the effect of allowing
researchers to ignore whatever is outside of their field, in contrast to real social experience. The
psychologist, sociologist, and economist bring different analyses to any given social occurrence,
sometimes even using incompatible conceptual frameworks. It is little wonder that crossdisciplinary cooperation is difficult. This situation "guarantees backwardness," and this
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"fragmentation prevents us from grasping causes and connections.”111 The institutional
arrangement promotes and encourages failure.
For Dewey, "causality is a logical category, not an ontological one.”112 The positivist
ascribes to events an inherent "if x then y" structure than is procedurally deterministic. Each
piece of data becomes the thing that causes the next in a line of inferential succession. "The
scientific problem is not, as the positivists would have it, to make better predictions. The
scientific problem is to identify what it is about the nature of water and seeds such that a good
rain will (ceteris paribus) cause the seeds to grow.”113 What kinds of associations and
interactions does the object exhibit? Situations demanding verification do not provide
conclusions that are determined in advance of our inquiring about them. We can only discover
associations with a purpose in mind. We cannot methodologically proceed as if the "essence" of
each thing naturally and necessarily leads to the next proper thing in the great chain of being.
Science has enormous social import because "every measure of policy put into operation is,
logically, and should be actually, of the nature of an experiment.”114 We must be able to interpret
the consequences of a hypothesis; we must also not treat the premises that make up the
hypothesis as immutable laws that causally determine the ends achieved. What we are
discovering is how objects interact. Dewey flatly reminds us that "there are no such things as
uniform sequences of events.”115 A consequence of the sequential determinism characteristic of
positivistic science is the removal of human purposes from the explanation of absolutely
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everything; human beings, as human beings, no longer have any association with nature. The
causal determinist removes the human agent entirely and replaces agency with a necessary
sequence of component parts.
The philosophical views given in this chapter form the basis of the critique of economic
thinking that will be put forward in the next chapter. Recent anthropological research is, and has
been, confirming the validity of Dewey's opposition to fundamental dualisms and the modernist
obsession with highly specialized and specific epistemological problems. Most cultures
throughout history have assumed interrelatedness in experience and inquiry, and form no strict
division between "culture" and "nature." Inquiry in general is integrated into social life and
conclusions are not provided a separate existence for most peoples.116
The principle of continuity, which Dewey maintains throughout his work sees the whole
of experience as processes of growth and adaptation. Economic science disregarded this
perspective to the utmost degree throughout most of its history, as we will see. This next chapter
will address why rationalization and our devotion to the market god is not a good thing. Most
economic science is implicitly or explicitly opposed to cultural naturalism because of the logic
that it follows and by the way these sciences are practiced. The orthodox economists of the late
eighteenth century and throughout the nineteenth century showcase the antithesis of cultural
naturalism and rationalization. The effect of this is subservience to the Market God, not in a
metaphorical fashion, but in a very real sense. Everything stated in the next chapter should be
read with the philosophical conclusions of this chapter kept in mind.
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CHAPTER 4
A CULTURAL NATURALIST'S CRITIQUES' OF ORTHODOX ECONOMIC SCIENCE
Secondly, there came also the trend to unconditional profit-making. The primacy of business interests was
proclaimed around the world. Once profit-making becomes unconditional, things are important only to the extent
that they can be made to serve economic needs. At this point, man comes to be regarded merely as a factor of
production. Life becomes just one vast business operation. Heaven and Earth are reduced to being an enormous
factory, and everyone who lives off of it and is a part of it is registered as if in some giant ledger book according to
his monetary value. All ideals which are oriented toward the human person and all endeavors which are geared to
human welfare are eradicated. What counts now is the fullest possible development of the business mechanism.
What is purely a means becomes the absolute goal.117

We can now examine pure economic science from the vantage point of cultural naturalism,
but first, let's observe a potential social consequence of "pure" economic science.It is to the great
embarrassment of "pure" economic science that the household is not more rational and that the
individuals who compose the household-economic-unit usually fail to assess the demands of the
market. It is not yet possible for very many sexually active people, who are associated through the
marriage contract, to conduct rational cost-benefit analyses regarding the production of additional
human resources with any degree of precision. It would be a modest proposal to provide married
individuals with the appropriate statistical models necessary for predicting how they ought to
proceed in light of the general human resource problem. Perhaps, it could be statistically
determined, with at least a greater degree of accuracy, how many additional human resources
ought to be produced to ensure the least number of irrational economic actors and to ensure the
socially optimal outcome.
The household is the last bastion of irrationality, superstition, and inefficient artistic
production dominated by craftsmen, that the market must overcome if efficient production and
consumption is to be encouraged. The household is admitted by most economists to be a
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fundamentally important economic unit.118 What good is pure economic science if households
consistently refuse to acquiesce to the laws of enlightened self-interest? Superstition and
obedience to wanton passions are generally looked down upon, so it is rational to guide the
household to more effectively measure the value of its activities via the objective measure of
price. This method is even superior to utilitarianism because price is prima facie quantified and
therefore more easily interpreted than the "hedon" could ever be.
This market intrusion into the household would first be seen as an insult to propriety, but
this situation is entirely malleable. Individuals could be encouraged to conduct more effective
cost-benefit analysis within the household, and the socially optimal outcome would be promoted
even further. The principle of accumulation for the sake of profit for the promotion of the general
welfare could easily be instilled within the household. The use of contracts could be culturally
encouraged and extended to all familial matters to guarantee smooth transactions and the
efficient functioning of the free market mechanism.
Families must adjust themselves to the demands of the Market. Where they live, work,
and raise their offspring is usually determined by impersonal "job opportunities." What is often
taught to children is how to survive in light of the Market's demands. Who to associate with, and
how, is mediated by Market considerations. This "private sphere" of family life does not look
very private. The ancient Greek terms "oikos" and "nomia" form the origin of our word
"economic," but "oikos" referred to the household, while "nomia" referred to management. The
Greek conception of "economics" was something like the practice of caring for the household.
The "polis" was the public, political realm where one was expected to present oneself. The
assumption of the Greek view is that the care of the home was the central problem of the
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"economy." Today, the household serves the Market.
This is all very dystopian. It would all seem to be material for fiction if it were not for the
fact that the theoretical foundations used here are upheld by the Austrian and Chicago schools of
economics.119 Today, most economists treat economics as a problem involving individual
calculators of monetary costs and benefits. No other factors are considered worthy of
consideration when analyzing macro or micro economic situations. It will now be shown that
Cultural Naturalism is almost entirely incompatible with the ideas of orthodox or "neoclassical"
economics.
First, it is necessary to strike at the heart of what is wrong with attempts at reducing all
experience to the ideological model of “the market religion.” The previous chapter on Cultural
Naturalism emphasized the startling conclusion that “value,” “significance,” or meaning is at the
very top of the hierarchy of needs. Food, sex, water and shelter occur within a vast matrix of
associations and the (almost always unintentional) fracturing and atomizing of these associations
can, and sometimes does, lead to despair, purposelessness, decay, and death. The market faith
has forced individuals of every persuasion to observe and embody a cultural landscape wherein
concepts serve as the metaphorical equivalent of heavy artillery in a battle over different forms of
social association. The consummatory experiences of beauty, artistic expression (both in practice
and enjoyment) and even the sublimity of the mysterious, are relegated to mere means in service
to abstract, formalistic plans for future forms of interaction. Of course, these battling economic
forms of social interaction are remarkably limited in variety.
The conceptual artillery continues to rain down ad infinitum since distinctions and
elaborations upon the foundational premises promote rationalization further. We can become
increasingly estranged from the kinds of experiences that Dewey describes in Art as Experience
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and which serve to integrate us so closely with our environments. Art as Experience is not
merely a descriptive project. It can also be understood as an attempt to rehabilitate us. The
“market mechanism” or Stalin's “Real Existing Socialism” are symbols so distant from our finite
embodied activities, and yet these conceptual constructions must be deployed to fill in for the
experiential fractures and disconnects that thwart consummation but that we reflectively
constructed initially. The Market disciple is not genuinely introspective in that the conceptual
artillery shells continue to be fired, thus assuring an experiential Verdun, devoid of much
consummation. The question of what experience seems to tell us, what the basic rhythms and
vitalities of life illustrate for us, is utterly forgotten in favor of a formalism that could never
replace integration, involvement, and genuine participation with significant forms of expression.
Experience is not only being reduced to cognitively determinate language (at the expense of the
recognition of the precognitive); it is being reduced to a remarkably specific and peculiar
language that is the culmination of the centuries-old rationalization that was explored early on in
this work. Dewey’s emphasis on the precariousness of existence reminds us that the Market’s
proselytizing mission could be, or become, suicidal if the means and ends which perpetuate it are
no longer even recognized as human means and human ends. The dualism separating “nature”
and “culture” functions to lead us to the conceit that we must always bring the “form” that is
“culture” to bear on seamless manifold “matter” or “nature.” This cultural “form” has been the
process of rationalization for some time now. Anthropologists such as Philippe Descola have
empirically demonstrated that many cultures cannot conceive of separating “nature” and
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“culture.”120 Nature conceived separately from culture reduces it to something that is not
inherently meaningful; it is only meaningful insofar as it is “standing-reserve."121
Mark Fisher, in Capitalist Realism, discusses how “representations” and “symbols”
within the market system are usually granted higher ontological status, and thus importance, than
the practical, social processes of adaptation to the precariousness of life.122 Symbols used to meet
productivity targets, or to measure or denote certain kinds of narrowly defined economic
associations function to isolate abstract “human resources” from the wider field of activity.
Fisher uses both the market system and Stalinism to illustrate this problem. The familiar issue of
a project “looking good on paper” but failing to be a practical solution is a failure of means
satisfying ends, but the problem hints at more ingrained and substantial habits of thought.
Extreme examples of this occur when the ideological, symbolic requirements are met but the end
product does not function as intended in practice. Sometimes it is pretended that the end product
does work as intended to ensure that the failed assumptions maintain their symbolic significance.
It was stated earlier that the market faith reflexively distances us from precognitive experience
by guiding our selective attention toward its own symbols, as if these symbols expressed the
fixed essence of “nature,” the “individual,” or “society.” The whole of what we do and undergo
is assigned a remarkably precise, narrow set of functional meanings. The ability to readjust or to
creatively reimagine our problems becomes increasingly difficult the more this market faith is
zealously defended.
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The central issue is one of “values,” but the term “values” is so historically laden with
uses totally contrary to cultural naturalism that it is difficult to employ. "Values,” rather than
having a separate, ethereal existence in atomistic minds, or residing in the objective movement of
Geist, are time-honored links established between means and ends. How things are brought into
connection, and for what purposes, brings to light what “values” are. It is often implied that
values spring into being from the reflective capacity of each conscious individual but…
there is no mysterious uniqueness about consciousness. A great deal of nonsense has been written
about its unshareability. It is often remarked, as if it were a profound insight, that one can never
really get into another person’s consciousness. But this is not as extraordinary as it has been
represented to be. If an adjustment is being made and I happen to be in the focus of that
adjustment, and myself, as a part of the whole, cooperating in constituting it, then, of course, the
rest of the universe (including other members of society) will be out of that focus in the margin
somewhere. Two persons could not very well be at the same focal point without coalescing into
one. And if consciousness is simply the process of the universe when and where it is undergoing
tensional transformation, then it is no marvel that no other individual feels this tension just as I do.
I am this center of transformation, this focus of adjustment, while yet it is the focusing of the
entire system.123

"Values" are those adaptations that have been socially successful, reflected upon, and expressed
symbolically. Bawden's statement suggests that "values" emerge when each person's adaptation,
being a focus of adjustment, coalesces and agrees in the process of social cooperation. The fact
that these adaptations are in mutual harmony (thus opening new possibilities) intensifies the
activity and provides the opportunity for granting what was precognitive symbolic significance.
If Bawden's concise naturalist statement holds, then the “focus of adjustment” should be
recognized as located not within the immutable laws of the Market but in individual and social
processes. Therefore, one cannot make pronouncements concerning the “invisible hand” causing
certain natural social events to occur because of some externally imposed “law” of behavior.
What human beings actually do and actually undergo is what concerns us.
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Now it is appropriate to examine individual economists with cultural naturalism in hand.
The thinkers will be introduced somewhat chronologically. Adam Smith is often held up as the
architect of free-market economics, so this critique will begin with him. Some general problems
are characteristic of all the orthodox economists we will examine. They all serve that
compendium of habits of thought and action that have been termed rationalization, but these
economists each offer somewhat unique ideas to be criticized. The consequences of a surprising
number of these ideas have been demonstrably horrifying, while others have been seemingly
more benign. What we will witness most of all is what rationalization looks like when put into
practice and accepted as "real." The premises of orthodox economics has remained shockingly
stable from its inception to the present day, and that will become increasingly noticeable as this
critique moves forward. These economists all are dealing with problems of life and death, but it
is hard not to notice that the language and form of economic expression has become increasingly
banal, formalistic, and specialized over time. This is the central consequence of rationalization in
microcosm. The ideas central to cultural naturalism discussed in the previous chapter must now
be brought to bear on the enormous faith that the following thinkers have in the market.
Adam Smith's whole project is an attempt to bring a sense of meaning and purpose to an
otherwise inscrutable new social world. The foundations laid by his new philosophy, which grew
out of the historical practice of rationalization, has been elaborated and expanded upon until the
present day. However, economists after Smith have moved away from traditional theological
notions, as well as virtue ethics, more than Smith would have ever fathomed. Smith believed that
our pursuit of riches "is always founded upon the belief of our being the object of our attention
and approbation. The rich man glories in his riches, because he feels that they naturally draw
upon him the attention of the world, and that mankind are disposed to go along with him in all
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those agreeable emotions with which the advantages of his situation so readily inspire him.”124
Adam Smith vigorously contested the idea that human nature is essentially selfish, or the idea
that accumulation could be an end in itself, but his thought has become the scaffolding of the
market faith regardless. Smith does have a thoroughly rationalized view of society and nature,
despite not having an unbridled faith in the market mechanism (he was very suspicious of the
merchant and manufacturer's ability to conspire against the common good).125 He claims that "in
almost every other race of animals each individual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely
independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the assistance of no other living creature."126
It is the task of human beings to procure the affections of others, despite the natural inclination
toward independence. Smith finds that the atomistic, isolated individual creature is in a more
natural state than if it were dependent (this is very reminiscent of Thomas Hobbes). Chapter Two
of Book One in the Wealth of Nations puts the new Newtonian, rationalized worldview on full
display. Each individual is treated as a bundle of self-interest that might, perhaps, consider the
passions of others, so long as the transaction is of mutual advantage. "It is not from the
benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we expect our dinner, but from their
regard to their own interest...Nobody but a beggar chooses to depend chiefly upon the
benevolence of his fellow citizens."127 This principle could theoretically be extended as far as
one would like.
What Smith provides us is a new ideal for which to strive. The beggar is simply
irrational and has chosen her path incorrectly. Irrationality describes anything that opposes the
process of rationalization, anything that even so much as invokes virtue ethics. The focus on
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mechanically rearranging social conditions at the exclusion of personal habits required for
personal and social flourishing is a complete abandonment of the virtue ethics tradition. One
could rummage through Smith's collected works to reimagine and reinterpret what he really
meant, but it seems clear what the practical, historical effects of these ideas has been. "The
economic historian Murray Rothbard reports that Adam Smith neckties were worn as a badge of
honor in the upper echelons of the Reagan Administration."128 Whatever Smith "really
advocated," he is now the patron saint of the laissez-faire market system. However, he did claim
that individuals did not need to practice virtue in order to live in a just society, since the social
mechanisms of a market society would guarantee sufficient amiability for harmonious living.129
The cultural naturalist cannot accept that Smith's method of inquiry is science properly
understood. Smith relied on the application of mechanical law, an order of fixed sequences of
events, a pre-established order that it is our duty to uncover and elucidate. Smith's method of
inquiry may be centuries old and stocked full of theological premises that are no longer attended
to, but to this day much of his approach has been retained. Smith saw in his descriptions of social
life the workings of the divine. His task was to accurately describe the natural order as it was
initially designed, and he states that "philosophy is the science of the connecting principles of
nature."130 This natural order was presumed to be Newtonian and thus mechanical, but we have
seen that the pre-determined "causal chain" is not compatible with the observations and
conclusions of the cultural naturalist. Smith insists that Newton's "universal empire" is the
supreme philosophy.131 Smith is still very concerned with social harmony, i.e. justice (unlike
economists we will witness later), but he relies in practice on human beings having fixed,
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immutable essences. The passages from Smith just cited refer to individuals behaving
mechanically in a predictable, self-interested fashion. Of course, what counts as "self-interested"
is also narrowly defined. Accumulation, self-interest, and rationality are already intimately
related in this relatively early stage in the development of economic thought.
However, we have seen that "accumulation" and even "self-interest" only derive the
significance that they have through social interaction and communication. There is no
preestablished guarantee that the behaviors of Smith's law of supply and demand will even
persist. Every application of the law of supply and demand is therefore the reaffirmation of an
ethical postulate. Smith's law of supply and demand states that as prices for a good or service rise
the quantity demanded falls, and as prices for a good or service fall the quantity demanded rises.
This is all an account of social behavior and what ought naturally to be the case.
Adam Smith, and other thinkers who contributed to capitalist theory such as John Locke,
Hobbes (with his rationally self-interested individual), Hume and many others were trying to
answer a fundamentally difficult question. Upon what basis can anyone claim moral ownership
of anything? John Locke is noteworthy because he presents an odd synthesis of rationalization
with the older natural law view. Locke did assume that morality stemmed from Nature or God,
but he transferred the teleological focus to the individual. Labor provides the right to property.
The right of owning is now more central than the responsibilities involved with owning property.
Even the natural law theorist now saw the primary economic unit as the atomized individual. Life
itself becomes increasingly a matter of attaining individual self-sufficiency. Life, liberty, and
property all must be secured on the basis of an individual actor's efforts.132 This is a religious
worldview of individuals each securing their place in the world. Life is the primary end, but
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liberty and property are necessary for that end. If property is secured on a solely individual
foundation, then we have a very atomized view of life's activities. We have a view of the world
involving individuals and their natural individual rights. The one-sidedness of this social view is
striking.
Jean-Baptiste Say (1767-1832) saw himself as a direct disciple of Adam Smith, and his
conclusions make him worth mentioning. Say was convinced that "a free market would always
adjust automatically to an equilibrium in which all resources-- including labor-- were fully
utilized, that is, to an equilibrium with full employment of both labor and industrial capacity."133
"Say's Law" has to do with the natural movement of capitalists and consumers corresponding
with rates of profit and supply and demand. Behavior is dictated wholly by the laws of the
competitive free market.
The classical economist Nassau Senior (1790-1864) provides a look at the market faith
put into practice politically without any reservation. Senior became influential in the Whig party
and was granted a position in the Poor Law Labor Commission. He helped create a new poor law
that held to the following position...
(1) workers should accept any job the market offered, regardless of the working conditions or the
pay involved; (2) any person who would not or could not find work should be given just barely
enough to prevent physical starvation; and (3) the dole given to such a person should be
substantially lower than the lowest wage offered in the market, and his general situation should be
made so miserable and should so stigmatize him as to motivate him to seek any employment ,
irrespective of the pay or conditions.144

The market for these thinkers is a mechanism, and different social groups make up its parts. If
one group fails in its role within the overall mechanism (and the working class is usually blamed)
then we must somehow make the circulation of trade more efficient, thus reducing externalities.
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Rationalization in these cases are "habits" in the naturalist sense. Rationalization is now
the social condition set by prior customs. A critique of the social programs of Say and Nassau
must notice that the market is no longer a social hypothesis but has an air of factuality that
renders it practically immune to experimental tampering. Matters of life and death are decided by
the way things are thought to be necessarily ordered. Nassau and Say view the market as the way
things are so that social conditions must be made to properly reflect this reality. The suggestion
that economists such as Nassau and Say were "greedy" or "selfish" or "lacked compassion" is at
once banal as well as unscientific and unhelpful. They expressed a market tradition and ordered
life as such. The purpose of a naturalist critique is not to immediately demonize existential and
social conditions but to elucidate them in order to offer the potential for attaining objects of
experimental inquiry. Smith, Say and Nassau have an idealistic, fixed view of the end they want
to achieve. The fact was that the poor had to be kept impoverished as the means by which their
fixed ideal was to be reached. The proper application of the experimental method would demand
that our available means inform our ends and vice versa. If means or ends are neglected then we
breed fanaticisms that have completely lost sight of the contexts of problems.
Thomas Malthus's work An Essay on the Principle of Population (1798) is rationalization
taken to grandiose heights. He uses a simple mathematical principle to deduce that population is
swiftly overtaking our capacity to produce sustenance. Populations are said to increase
geometrically while resources required for sustaining the population increase arithmetically.134
Malthus prophesies an untenable situation that is swiftly approaching. Again, this fails the
naturalists assessment regarding what counts as experimental method. Malthus uses a
hypothetical mathematical model to assess a social situation and finds that the social scene does
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not consent to his model. Malthus assumes that the production of population and the production
of necessary resources remain fixed regardless of our attitudes toward them and that these social
processes are not themselves objects of experimental inquiry. Malthus' conclusions may appear
downright archaic and benign, but the reliance on mathematical modelling in contemporary
economics is, as we shall see, surprisingly similar to Malthus' approach. I would presume that
many contemporary economists would immediately take issue with the primitive mathematical
model used, but what of Malthus' view of scientific method and inquiry in general? Malthus'
very notions of population, necessary resources, and their relations are the result of a rationalistic
culture; it is a shared, communicated world.
Malthus' conclusions and method do not encourage human flourishing because the
method employed does not advance social intelligence: a formula is imposed upon social life
without taking into account sufficiently the practical way in which life is suffered and lived.
Malthus looks at human sexual passion as a law unto itself that will remain fairly constant.135
Malthus looks at social life in general as a mechanical system of checks and balances.
Populations rise and fall, depending on the grinding death brought about by the necessary
tendency for populations to exceed the amount of resources necessary to sustain them. We are
caught in an ethical paradox that is rationally consistent, yet hardly reflective of "the facts." It is
the task "of the most penetrating mind to calculate its periods," namely, the periods of destitution
and abundance in the market-society. What Malthus is asking us to measure are the results of our
own postulates and habits. Malthus believed that the price of labor would fall as laborers became
more abundant. The abundance of laborers was attributed to the abundance of resources that
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allowed for breeding. The laborer is comfortable at this stage until population inevitably outpaces
resource production. At this stage the price of labor will increase drastically due to starvation.
This problem will occur cyclically ad infinitum. This is a very deterministic, mechanical world.
David Hume wrote on the new market economy from the perspective of his moral
philosophy, and this involved the idea that public utility is the sole origin of justice. The
problems and conclusions that he reached shed enormous light on the problems associated with
rationalized modernity. He struggled, as did Smith, with the question of whether vast material
wealth has a deleterious or beneficial effect on our moral sentiments. Hume was writing during a
period of economic transition, but he obviously emphasizes the benefits of the new economic
faith and claims that the ethical benefits far outweigh the costs of this change. It is characteristic
of him to isolate a (perhaps the) central problem, and here he does exactly that. He first assumes
that the new economic order will in fact distribute material wealth optimally to the population.
Hume assumes for his argument that the new economic regime is beneficial: "there is some
highly rational element in human nature which once exposed to 'refinement' inevitably leads one
to the continued pursuit of 'true' pleasure-- a view which is not readily reconcilable with and the
Stoic's emphasis on the difficulty of the instinctive and irrational elements in human
behavior.”136 We are again caught in a dilemma that has plagued contemporary and modern
ethical thinking. The problem has two aspects. First the dualism constructed between "reason"
and "instinct" is unhelpful and theoretically questionable. Second, and just as important, the new
market economy demands habits of thought that center around quantitative accumulation if the
market is to expand and for capital to circulate for the sake of profit. These habits are directly at
odds with the refined moderation that Hume advocates. It is as if the distinct faculty of "reason"
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is supposed to descend upon us and curb those very habits that are necessary for the proliferation
of markets.
We are also called upon to measure our activities with regard to their general propensity
to dispense happiness. This requires a detached, abstracted perspective that measures utility and
form habits in the personal and economic spheres relative to entirely different standards. The
trouble with rationalization is especially noticeable in Hume's economic writings because Hume
must construct an unassailable line of demarcation between our avaricious passions and our
rational intellect. However, we have seen that this is not how experience is structured. In fact, the
social conditions that Hume describes are most noteworthy because of the apparent need to
assess, almost always cognitively, each situation's capacity for producing "refined happiness."
The issue is that our experience is not primarily cognitive. Our relations to an environment can
become cognitive while we mutually adapt to it, but our habits will guide our selective attention
whether or not we become cognitively aware of the specific relations in any given situation.
Hume presents us with an impossible task, but it is to his credit that he identifies such a serious
difficulty with modern economic conditions.
The adoption of Hume's advice is a demonstration of rationalization's foothold in
practical life. Social conditions under the Market faith demand a constantly detached and
reserved assessment and evaluation of situations so as to determine their utility. These
"detached" habits of measuring are utterly opposed to Dewey's hopes for human life and
civilization generally. We must be allowed to engage with our environments and perceive their
deep value. This requires the rhythmic intensification of experiences without constantly
experienced disjointedness. Intensification is stunted when our habits are to look consistently to
future utilities to be gained, thus robbing the present of its significance.
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These eighteenth-century thinkers were given the enormous task of interpreting a social
world with the Newtonian model as evidently the most successful means of conducting any
inquiry. "It would seem evident, none the less, that of all areas of human behavior Hume
believed the field of 'politics' to be the most fruitful for scientific analysis."137 Hume was surely
not alone in thinking this. Newton pushed the physical sciences to new heights, but moral
science looked comparatively primitive. Adam Smith made it plain that Newton set the definitive
standard for all inquiry.138 Nassau’s and Say's economic ideas and the ominous decision to
implement new poor laws stem from the decision to mechanize culture fully in a deterministic,
Newtonian, utopian vision. Why should the laws governing the heavenly bodies, by which we
can predict their movements, not also inform how we direct economic policy?
The nineteenth century witnessed the apotheosis of rationalization in economic analysis
and in social studies generally. Recall Hugh Kearney's statement that the mechanistic
metaphysical view became an almost unquestionable dogma in learned circles for much of this
century. The Romantic philosophical movement attempted to diffuse this tendency, but
economists seemed impervious to the Romantic's pleas. Alfred Marshall, the Austrian School, a
number of English economists, and others clung to mechanistic rationalization and the rationally
self-interested individual.
The influence of utilitarianism in such a tendency cannot be overstated. The hedonic
calculus and the focus on utility maximization eliminated any remnant of the old virtue ethics.
Economics could now use the concept of individual and social utility to ignore the cultivation of
virtue. What was conceived as subjective and qualitative was purged from economic analysis in
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favor of objective measurement without any serious ethical ideal proposed outside of the
promotion of a vague notion of material welfare (sometimes regardless of who received this
bounty). A scoundrel's utility counts as much as that of a saint's.
Rationalization entails depersonalization because it suffocates what is conceivably
possible in social life. Individuals rapidly become quantified means to the ideal end of material
abundance and social harmony that will be experienced in the distant future. The seemingly
abstract concept of rationalization is tied intimately to habitual justifications for the enslavement
of children. The early nineteenth century provided a situation where "children endured the
cruelest servitude. They were totally isolated from anyone who might take pity on them and were
thus at the mercy of the capitalists and their hired managers, whose main concern was the
challenge of competitive factories. The children's workday lasted from fourteen to eighteen hours
or until they dropped from complete exhaustion."139 The fact that economic theories existed that
could rigorously defend these practices is proof enough of the unscientific uselessness of
accusing past capitalists of being "greedy" or "selfish" and ending the analysis on that note (as is
usually done). A fully rationalized culture is exemplified by individuals who practice efficient
production, accumulation, distribution, and calculation. We should not expect any population to
break with old habits and create new practices ex nihilo.
Thorstein Veblen's The Theory of the Leisure Class (1899) illustrates the ceremonial and
symbolic significance that accumulation adopted in the course of the Market's development. He
was a colleague of Dewey's in Chicago and the two influenced one another greatly. According to
Veblen, accumulated wealth had to be displayed, and codes of conduct revolve around how one
displayed what one accumulated. I interpret Veblen as explaining what practices erupted onto the
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social scene to fill the vacuum left by the end of the feudal order. Conspicuous consumption and
the tendency to value almost arbitrarily certain objects at the cost of general well-being are
associated meanings that developed under the basic assumptions of the Market faith.

I will

now turn to specific nineteenth century economists and their traditions. This tradition is most
notable for the extreme effort devoted to emulating Newton's ability to assign mathematical values
to natural forces. Jeremy Bentham serves as an excellent starting point. We find a concerted effort
in Jeremy Bentham and many subsequent worldly philosophers to construct ethics as an exact
mathematical science, and economic thinking increasingly reflected this effort. Contemporary
economic science still holds this as its ideal objective. Alfred Marshall used utilitarianism, and by
extension the principle of marginal utility, i.e. monetary quantity indicates the quantity of
"hedons," to imply that money is the measure of the quantity of pleasure received by the
consumer. Money became the identifying marker of desire in general. The hedon may have been
largely abandoned as the theoretical unit of pleasure, but the dollar took its place. The Market
knows what we want better than anyone, given our inability to meet the Market's ideal of
"rationality." Market rationality became the ethical ideal, so much so that to this day the ways in
which the Market suggests we ought to act are taken as natural facts rather than as moral
postulates. This is clearly in congruence with the anthropologist Clifford Geertz's definition of
religion that was given at the beginning of this work. He described religion as "a system of
symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive and long-lasting moods and motivations in
men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions
with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic." For
Bentham utility, pleasure, and happiness were synonymous. His An Introduction to the Principles
of Morals and Legislation (1780) became "the philosophical basis of neoclassical economics
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during the last several decades of the nineteenth century."140141 Rationalization and its mechanistic
habits of thought were now postulates dominated by an air of factuality. Bentham saw society as
an individualistic enterprise of calculating pleasure. We have seen that these traits are
fundamental to rationalization and that cultural naturalism’s analysis of experience and the social
nature of consciousness presents a very different reality.
Bentham states in his early writings that "no regulations nor any efforts whatsoever,
either on the part of subjects or governors, can raise the quantity of wealth produced during a
given period."152 He later abandoned his trust in the Market's ability to reach equilibrium
regarding supply and demand. Instead, he advocated for governmental interference to ensure that
wealth inequality did not become too great. What this really entails is a modification of the
practice of the Market religion, not a challenge to it. Bentham "believed in a diminishing
marginal utility of money."142 Redistribution is therefore not inherently wrong. But the standards
used for judgment and action are thoroughly market standards. The actual and potential of social
association is conceived in terms of the Market faith. What is most remarkable about the
economic thought of figures like Bentham is just how little has changed in these debates for
approximately three centuries. This is evidence, if anything, of profound intellectual stagnation.
Particularly predictable and noteworthy is Bentham's conviction that the incentive to work had to
be imposed upon the masses, since the masses were considered naturally lazy and unproductive.
This whole notion is dependent on the atomizing and calculative influence of rationalization and
is antithetical to the cultural naturalist's view of what experience is and means.
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Human activity is conducted within a context of deeply felt meanings and the bringing closer of
the hypothetical ideal through artistic expression in the present is what intensifies and heightens
our experiences. The project of forcing the masses to submit to the market mechanism, and to
place their faith in it, annihilates much of the significance of what we do and undergo. Market
efficiency and the ideal equilibrium of supply and demand is a distant, utopian end-in-view that
never approaches consummation for the individual worker. Artistic expression requires some
control over the selection of materials and ends in the environment. The absence of this freedom
creates conditions where work is oppressive and meaningless. Bentham judged the masses lazy
when in fact he judged them lackluster practitioners of the Market faith. In tightly knit
communities people work hard simply to be valuable (and valued) members of that society.
When bonds are weak such incentive evaporates.
Bentham's dualistic, confrontational individualism and the atomization characteristic of
rationalization, engender situations with barriers to the very conditions that foster communication.
Individual cognition is an adaptive capacity through the use of symbols that gain the meanings
that they do through social use. If "ordinary persons" who, "in accordance with human nature,"
are "egoistic and interested in maximizing their own pleasure," then Bentham has presented us
with a Hobbesian ethical mathematics that can serve to bring cultural symbols under the fold of
the Market faith.143 Rationalization has perhaps lasted so long because it is a general collection of
habits of thought that can subsume expression in general within its matrices of interdependent
symbols. The individual is a unit in the Market mechanism as is the unit of pleasure, and these
units must function in specific ways for the Market to function according to its ideal, which is the
ideal for which we all must strive. The Market's status as a religion is also demonstrated by the
fact that when we must attain belief and get rid of doubt in difficult social matters, the Market is
143
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the final, and most authoritative, source of doubt alleviation.
The next sources that will be examined were all published by economists in the late
nineteenth century. Alfred Marshall definitively broke with much of the tradition by insisting
that "ethical forces are among those of which the economist has to take into account. Attempts
have indeed been made to construct an abstract science with regard to the actions of an
'economic man,' who is under no ethical influences and who pursues pecuniary gain warily and
energetically, but mechanically and selfishly. But they have not been successful, nor even
thoroughly carried out.”144 It would be difficult to blame Marshall for not identifying the peculiar
ethic of 'economic man.' The "mechanical" economic doctrines were so widely accepted during
Marshall's life that he assumed that these doctrines were free of normativity. The severe mistake,
according to Marshall, is the refusal to include ethical thinking in economic analyses. Economic
science could therefore be a pure positive science in theory. Marshall does not wish to dismiss
any motivational factor in economic action.
Marshall no longer expects every class of persons to calculate their interests with equal
effectiveness. He believes that the rationality of individuals rests on a sliding scale, and he terms
this his "Principle of Continuity."145 Marshall admirably concedes that various groups measure
their successes differently, and that these standards change over time, but he does not go so far as
Dewey. Marshall retains his standard of optimal market rationality and assesses various groups
according to that standard (the implicit assumption being that mechanical action and
quantification are still the epitome of rational thinking). He does not want to "draw artificial lines
of division where nature has made none," so that economic categories are no longer static, but
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the content considered significant undergoes little change.146 Marshall is desperately trying to
make economic science more flexible in a changing world, but he can give up almost none of the
serious assumptions that constitute the Market faith. Marshall attempted to adapt the thought of
Herbert Spencer and G.W.F. Hegel to the practice of orthodox economics but was constrained by
the Newtonian assumptions of his field. While physics eventually moved on with Einstein and
Heisenberg, et. al., economics remains stuck with Newton.
Marshall very clearly states that "the steadiest motive to ordinary business work is the
desire for the pay which is the material reward of work...the motive (to work) is supplied by a
definite amount of money: and it is this definite and exact money measurement of the steadiest
motives in business life, which has enabled economics far to outrun every other branch of the
study of man."147 Despite Marshall's new emphasis on evolutionary continuity, his fundamental
assumptions remain totally embedded in traditional views. Marshall believes that economics has
discovered something constant about human nature, and he attributes the success of economic
science to this recognition. Cultural naturalists hold the contrary view that what is being
measured is the relative success or failure of a particular social experiment. What Marshall is
admitting is that a rationalized faith has been communicated and practiced for such an extended
period that the meanings of the symbols used are now fairly constant. The phrase "ordinary
business work" is very telling. Ordinary practice is still a mechanical matter concerning
costbenefit analysis.
I believe that sociology, anthropology, psychology, and philosophy have all "outrun" this
kind of economics concerning the "study of man." This is because the opposite of Marshall's

146
147

Ibid. ix
Marshall, Alfred. Principles of Economics. Vol. 8. London: Macmillon and Company, 1930 . 14

78
conclusions are often more accurate descriptions of the human condition.148 Anthropologists
have helped reveal the diversity of human cultural experience. Sociologists could, and surely
have, described the ceremonial significance of "ordinary business" and contrasted these
ceremonies with the behavior of other social classes.149 Contemporary sociologists almost never
contend that group behavior and values could be accurately measured by tracking monetary
spending . Marshall's conclusions must appear to the contemporary social scientist like ethical
assumptions, prescriptions, and descriptions of, at most, the cultural practices of the modern
industrialized world rather than objective and universal descriptions of "human nature."
Marshall holds the view that the quantity of money spent is the measure of the quantity of
pleasure received (which is the same here as "value received"). He makes this clear by
maintaining that "an opening is made for the methods and tests of science as soon as the force of
a person's motives --not the motives themselves-- can be approximately measured by the sum of
money, which he will just give up in order to secure a desired satisfaction; or again by the sum
which is just required to induce him to undergo a certain fatigue."150 I remarked at the beginning
of this work that price, for liberal economists, is held up as the only means by which we can
measure value, and this idea is on full display in Marshall's Principles of Economics.
Communication is distinguished by creative anticipation of the intents and dispositions of others.
If we constrict reflection by assigning fixed value solely to the "money spent" as the signifier of
the "pleasure received," then we will habitually become stuck in rationalization. Marshall's
hypothesis is a self-fulfilling prophecy because he is reifying the social function of price. We
behave in large part according to our creative anticipations of others, and our self-hood is defined
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by how we appropriate and give back symbols in a social setting. The symbol, "price," serves a
social function that Marshall wants to emphasize further despite the fact that it already serves
that function.
This kind of analysis may broaden and enrich our common sense to some extent, but
these conclusions and methods are largely constraining because they reaffirm and justify ethical
postulates that are already believed religiously. If they were not believed religiously, in Clifford
Geertz's sense, then they would not be utilized as incontrovertible, factual standards. Human
flourishing requires growth and thus adaptation. Experimental inquiry is necessary for effective
adaptation, and this sort of inquiry must include communication and intelligence if inquiry is to
be experimental at all. Intelligence is the constantly developing (or decaying) capacity to
anticipate consequences via communication in a precarious world. The obsession with money as
the sole symbol of real value undermines any attempt to promote social intelligence because it
limits what we can anticipate; it limits how we can adapt and how we experiment.
Marshall rejects a static economic normality, and he rejects the idea that economic laws
are exact in the same sense that physical laws are exact. He only maintains that economic laws
describe general tendencies. This is a more accurate description than what is generally found in
contemporary economics textbooks intended for undergraduate use, and it is more accurate than
what came before. Marshall defines "economic normality" as "that which may be expected in
the long run under certain conditions (provided these conditions are persistent) from the
members of an industrial group."151 I cannot find much fault in this idea of "normality," but there
is the general problem that "normal" infers expected and predictable when what we are talking
about is an ethical prescription.
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Marshall distinguishes "economic laws" as "those social laws which relate to branches of
conduct in which the strength of the motives chiefly concerned can be measured by a money
price."163 This is especially interesting because it assumes that, theoretically, economic laws
probably will not come to dominate most, if not all, "branches of conduct." What is or is not an
"economic law" is obviously a cultural matter. The idea of price as the universal measure of
value has encouraged a rationalized social scene wherein an increasing number of branches of
conduct are economic. The pursuit of profit tends to create situations involving monetary
transactions where there were none before. Economic laws can then begin to describe more of
our possibilities over time.
Marshall is perhaps most famous for his "marginal theory of utility," but "the utility
perspective in economic theory was incomplete until the entire economic process, as envisioned
and defined in this tradition, could be shown to be wholly the result of rational, calculating,
maximizing behavior."152 Marshall was a committed utilitarian, and he imbued his work with the
assumption that individuals operate on "rational, calculating, maximizing behavior." He went so
far as to believe that "[individual] utility-maximizing calculations controlled the real flow of the
services of capital and labor from the household sector to the business sector and of the
consumption of commodities from the business sector to the household sector.153" The trouble
with "utility maximizing calculation" as an ethical practice is that it is reductionistic regarding
meaning and value. Concrete activities and objects themselves, and all the relations that these
things involve, become mere means for the acquisition of abstract utils, i.e. money. The effect is
the outright dismissal of the significance of most of human experience for the sake of catching
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fleeting experiences of euphoria or "pleasure."154 The addition of a Market faith that utility
serves to assist only makes matters far worse.
We find in Marshall an attempt to include evolutionary thinking within a utilitarian,
market system. The contrast between these two approaches was severe enough to prompt
Thorstein Veblen to put forward a stinging indictment, which lead him to coin the term
"neoclassical economics." The problems that are brought to light by Marshall's work are so dire
and significant that no general agreement has been reached even today. The essays found in the
work What is Neoclassical Economics: Debating the Origins, Meaning and Significance reveals
something important and perhaps unsettling: the foundational concepts involved within
mainstream economic method could be archaic and fallacious. Veblen's cultural naturalism
informs this book. Unfortunately, many economists either ignored Veblen's criticisms, or they
were forgotten during the frenzied attempt to construct accurate mathematical economic models.
We can now suggest that our historical experience shows that it was not wise to dismiss Veblen
while the mathematical construction project went on unchecked. The economist Tony Lawson
writes in 2016 that
the contemporary discipline of economics, most now agree, has lost its way. It is easy enough to
demonstrate that this is due largely to the widespread contemporary persistence with methods of
mathematical modelling (whether through mainstream insistence or through heterodox
confusion/optimism) in conditions where this persistence is unwarranted. The ultimate solution
and, as Veblen clearly saw, basis for any relevant economics lies first in uncovering the nature of
social reality and second, certainly no less important, in taking seriously any ontological or
metaphysical insights so uncovered in fashioning the methods of economic science. It is to
understand the nature of society and then to ensure that research methods are appropriate to that
nature.155
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Our discussion of the historical practice of rationalization has lead us to today with our
"persistence with methods of mathematical modeling." My contention throughout has been that
this is a religious practice that was founded by economists' unbridled faith in the notion that we
could understand cultural objects using the same Newtonian methods used to understand the
objects investigated by the physical sciences. The kind of generalizations that Marshall wanted to
make are distinguished from generalizations made in the physical sciences only by their apparent
lack of predictive power. The Market demands this predictive power because as a functional
deity it needs this quantitative method in order to fix our collective belief. I anthropomorphize
the Market to help show its social function and that the Market is connected to a history.
Alasdair MacIntyre states outright that the bureaucrat of modernity, with his focus on excellence
as material efficiency, is a conceptual fiction that was constructed as a response to the ethical
vacuum in which individuals found themselves at the end of the Middle Ages.156 I agree with
him almost entirely, but instead rely on the framework of an open teleological naturalism that
comes from the American philosophical tradition. The only significant practical difference
between MacIntyre's position and my own is my claim that rationalization is a historically
religious practice and that the Market is a functional deity. John Dewey and Alasdair MacIntyre
would agree that the removal of teleology, i.e. purpose or final cause, from our methods of
inquiry was a colossal error that is difficult to fathom. Rationalization is a religious practice
devoid of telos. This is not to say that no ends are established in inquiry, but only that the ends
established are fairly immediately identical with the means used. The reasons given for the
engagement in rationalized inquiry become self-referential remarkably quickly because all
human action is, mechanically and "scientifically" speaking, interchangeable. Different kinds of
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objects and events do not display a different kind of telos. This quantitative interchangeability
makes the comprehension of unique purposes impossible.
Nineteenth-century economists such as W. Stanley Jevons, Alfred Marshall, Carl Menger
and F.Y. Edgeworth all can be said to have rationalistic worldviews, despite their differences.
The individual is a rational calculator of its interests. Those interests relate to the wider
mechanism of the Market. The Market is a religious concept because it establishes the final end
toward which all the rationally self-interested individuals are acting. A thriving Market provides
more utils, or material prosperity, to all. The Market is the only concept left in a rationalistic
worldview that is teleological, but the telos of the Market is nothing more or less than the
thought-to-be "natural" pursuit of material prosperity by mechanical means, understood largely
as governed by social laws that largely mirror the laws of the physical sciences.
F.Y. Edgeworth is noteworthy because he is perhaps the most exemplary theoretical
practitioner of rationalization and the Market faith imaginable. His work, Mathematical Psychics:
An Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the Moral Sciences, reaches into the inner life of
the human being, quantifies it, and formalizes those quantities. The purpose of Edgeworth's entire
project is unsurprisingly vague. He simply wants to mathematize the soul to promote the general
happiness, and he takes his project to be justified prima facie. Edgeworth immediately mentions
that Jevons is supportive of his project.157 Edgeworth quickly tries to argue that all phenomenon
can be understood quantitatively. This whole project is put into question by the cultural naturalist
account of experience and meaning as well as by the more specific account of means, ends, and
their relation. Edgeworth's entire enterprise exists within a self-contained normative box, and
perhaps this explains why he did not find it necessary to give reasons for why his purposes were
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justified. Mathematics could be applied to ethics through the hedonic calculus of economics.
Economics is trying to make ethics an exact, mathematical science.

The cultural naturalist

position implores us to view Edgeworth's mission as shockingly arbitrary. If we cannot give and
ask for reasons why the human being's virtues, habits, likes, and dislikes, ought to be
mathematized without falling into almost immediate circularity, then what we are dealing with is
an attempt at arbitrary social control. The quantification of all ethical behavior and even "mentalstates," such as likes and dislikes, preempts any other conception of human possibilities outside of
the system Edgeworth is putting forward. This reduces cultural objects to the status of physical
objects. The issue is that, because humans have such malleable habits, we could begin to resemble
those objects studied by physical science. This is a catastrophe because cultural beings, unlike
physical objects, are capable of reflecting imaginatively on their possibilities. Any attempt to
stifle such an ability conceptually will not make us increasingly moral or immoral, but
unreflective and amoral.
The twentieth century saw the horror of the Great Depression and two world wars, yet the
Market faith continued. Karl Polanyi helps us to understand why. T.W. Arnold, author of The
Folklore of Capitalism, is also immensely helpful.
Polanyi provides a place to begin: He remarks that "the nineteenth century was unique
precisely in that it centered on a definite institutional mechanism." He insists that "the
breakdown of our civilization was timed by the failure of world economy, it was certainly not
caused by it. Its origins lay more than a hundred years back in that social and technological
upheaval from which the idea of a self-regulating market sprang in Western Europe. The end of
this venture has come in our time; it closes a distinct stage in the history of industrial
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civilization.”158 Polanyi is correct except for his announcement that the idea of the self-regulating
market concept has died. Polanyi rightly lays the blame for the apocalyptic events of the
twentieth century at the feet of the self-regulating Market. Polanyi immediately goes on to notice
that powerful families such as the Rothschilds were loyal only to the international market and the
firms needed for that activity.159 They could not belong to a particular place. Time and space
could hold no relations that were sacred enough to prevent them from making "their fortune in
the financing of wars; they were impervious to moral consideration; they had no objection to any
number of minor, short, or localized wars."160
Polanyi's analysis of these powerful families ties directly with the cultural naturalist
account of meaning presented in the last chapter. If social relations that are rooted in shared
consummatory experience and expression are severed or omitted from human life, then an
environment can lose any sense of significance. What presumably remains significant for many
individuals involved in haute finance are those relations, which are the historical result of
rationalization. But, as we have seen, these kinds of relations are experientially transitory,
abstract, and conceptually dissociated from any particular time or place. This is one reason why
the importance of uncovering our Western historical experience is important: to show that our
thinking does inhabit a time and place. Rationalization is necessarily ahistorical. Quantified,
mechanical experience has no mythos in reflection; a grand mythic narrative is not available to
help the Rothschilds develop and strengthen an identity outside of their relations to rationalized
financial institutions. Anyone in the Rothschild's position, then or now, is able to appeal to the
Market faith when observers demand a justification for their behavior. It is tragic that these
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individuals personify the rationally self-interested, calculative individual through action. We are
seeing this now with respect to the Saudis. President Trump has suggested that we shouldn't be
too harsh on them for murdering an American citizen because, after all, they're very good
customers of U.S. made arms!
Polanyi comments further on the Market faith by reaching back further into history to a
pamphlet written by Daniel Defoe in 1704.
Defoe insisted that if the poor were relieved, they would not work for wages; and that if they were
put to manufacturing goods in public institutions, they would merely create more unemployment
in private manufactures. His pamphlet bore the satanic title: Giving Alms no Charity and
employing the Poor a Grievance to the Nation, and was followed by Doctor Mandeville's more
famous doggerels about the sophisticated bees whose community was prosperous only because it
encouraged vanity and envy, vice and waste. But while the whimsical doctor indulged in a shallow
moral paradox, the pamphleteer had hit upon basic elements of the new political economy.161

If there is any doubt that the contemporary world still thinks in Defoe's terms, then one need only
bring up the consistent use of the term "welfare queens," those unfortunate souls who function
improperly within the larger mechanism. The kind of ethical methodology that Defoe was
illustrating is not an ethical method at all. Ethical thought requires the recognition of human
potentiality. Defoe's description of the problem, and many contemporary descriptions as well,
look at the life of the community as though it were a purely "logical" problem in the sense that
the categories being employed are fixed and the conclusions of specific inquiries are finished. It
is curious that, once the Market faith became fact, it became inconceivable to question important
premises regardless of the fact that these premises prompted additional social problems. Polanyi
reinforces that problems were, and still are, real by recording that
there had been meanwhile a continuous growth in the number of the poor: in 1696, when Bellers
wrote, total rates approximated 400,000 pounds; in 1796, when Bentham struck out against Pitt's
bill, they must have passed the 2 million mark; by 1818, Robert Owen's beginnings, they were
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nearing 8 million. In the 120 years that elapsed between Bellers and Owen the population may
have trebled, but rates increased twentyfold. Pauperism had become a portent.162

Larry A. Hickman reminds us that, for the cultural naturalist, "ends-in-view are goals that are
formed, and continually reformed, as their measure is taken by the very means that are employed
with a view to their realization. Conversely, when ends are taken as ends-in-view, then means are
formulated and reformulated in the light of changing ends in-view.163" The early and many
contemporary defenders of the Market faith do not conduct inquiry in this way. The final and
fixed end then and today is the promotion of the proper functioning of the Market according to
general laws (that are largely based on the physical sciences) for the sake of material prosperity.
The trouble is that methods which take ends of inquiry as immutable "has led to dysfunctional
social stratification, gratuitous executions, and even open warfare, all of which have been
rationalized on idealistic grounds. The caste-system of Hindu India, the ‘witch’ trials of
seventeenth-century New England, and the Crusades of eleventh-century and twelfth-century
European Christianity all provide examples of idealistic strategies of ends-dominated
technological practice."176 My central claim here is that the ends established by the
religioushistorical practice of rationalization remain almost entirely fixed while the means to
achieve those ends change somewhat over time. Utilitariansim, quantification, materialism, a
methodical approach to action, etc., have been used historically as means toward achieving a
Market system that grants material prosperity. Daniel Defoe's 1704 pamphlet shows that the ends
of economic thought and practice have changed very little in three centuries. Metaphysical views
have altered over the centuries within cultures dominated by the Market faith, but the concept of

162

Ibid. 110
Hickman, Larry A. "Technologies of the World, Technologies of the Self: A Reply to Kenneth Stikkers."
The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 10, no. 4 (1996): 257-71. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25670197. 260
176
Ibid. 262
163

88
the lazy, useless, inefficient "pauper" or "welfare queen" fits just as well in Defoe's historical
context as it does our own.
Only a worldview with tremendous religious force could possibly compel so much of an
entire civilization to neglect to modify this end-in-view for centuries, when the end being
pursued is evidently unhelpful. If the end being pursued did not require modification, then there
would have been no justifiable reason for Gerrard Winstanley to have written either The True
Levellers Standard Advanced: Or, The State of Community Opened, and Presented to the Sons of
Men in 1649 or The Law of Freedom in a Platform in 1652. If the zealous, rationalized
practitioners of the Market faith had understood their ends to be modifiable ends-in view then
there would have been no impetus for the creation of socialism, anarchism, or Marxism.
Inflexibility demanded a genuine and determined response. This kind alteration away from fixed
ends in theory and practice would eliminate the Market's status as a deity.
Polanyi's notion of "fictitious commodities" is illuminating. He begins from the premise
that "it can be readily seen that market economy involves a society the institutions of which are
subordinated to the requirements of the market mechanism."164 Land, labor, and money itself were
commodified in this mechanism, but the issue is that these "commodities" are in fact the
necessary conditions for our biological survival. "Since the working of such markets threatens to
destroy society, the self-preserving action of the community was meant to prevent their
establishment or to interfere with their free functioning, once established."165 The atomization of
communities was a necessary ingredient for the later construction of monopoly and class division.
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A cultural naturalist must ask how commodified land, labor, and capital were constructed
as functional symbols before ultimately agreeing with Alasdair MacIntyre that these symbols are
socially deployed as measures of bureaucratic effectiveness posing as "virtue."166 Communities
did not decide upon commodification in a democratic fashion. This reformulation of land, labor,
and money is characterized by symbols that addressed problems construed and grasped by a
relatively minuscule cabal of highly educated men. The communities that had to suffer the
effects of the Market system were not a part of the community of inquirers that conceptualized
the Market faith. If we apply Dewey's understanding of communication to this situation we find
that the elites who grappled with these problems of social organization fixed their goals without
creatively anticipating the meaning of their abstractions through conversation with the wider
community. Mechanistic thinking of the kind that has been investigated throughout this work
rules out this conversational, open, teleological approach as a matter of course. Knowledge of the
Market was treated as a source of hidden truth that had only to be described correctly and then
implemented for the sake of material salvation. The extreme danger of commodifying land,
labor, and exchange itself, devoid of significant and participatory communication with the wider
community can hardly be overstated. A relatively small community of inquirers could not hope
to imagine the direct consequences, let alone the indirect consequences, of implementing a
paradigm shift in social thinking. It is clearly an impossible task.
The workers and peasantry reacted to the commodification of land, labor and money after
they noticed that such things as "the commons" no longer existed, since they were removed from
their lands through acts of enclosure. An imposing, antagonistic, inscrutable social force was,
from their perspective, apparently seeking to harm them. Economists saw these inevitable losses
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as externalities necessarily suffered for the sake of installing the free-market system. Workers
and peasants who did not comply were considered lazy and largely incapable of rational,
selfinterested, cost-benefit analysis. Rationalization functioned as the set of conceptual tools
used to justify the project. The point is not whether we are on our way to the utopian free-market
society in the idealized long-run. The problem is the method used and the habits of thought that
are so clearly examples of what Dewey wanted to expose as ultimately ineffectual and far
removed from how we actually experience and solve problems.
John Maynard Keynes' essay “Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren” is a
masterpiece of mechanistic utopianism. Keynes merely reaffirms the benefits of "technical
efficiency" and shows that our labor practices are maladjusted to technological progress. One
need only tamper with the system in such a way that reflects the economic facts and we shall
have freedom from want. He believes that our economic problems will be solved in one-hundred
years (so by 2030). Keynes implicitly assumes that Bernard Mandeville was correct and insists
that human kind's "relative needs" are insatiable and infinite, thus guaranteeing relative scarcity.
Keynes divides the economic pursuit of basic needs from higher cultural pursuits. Constant
surplus and abundance will finally free us from the admittedly unreasonable love of money, and
we will be able to once again condemn usury and avarice. The stated assumption is that the
flourishing of the technologically advanced market system will bring about a moral paradigm
shift that frees us all.167
Nothing in Keynes' essay strays away from rationalization and its associated habits of
thought. What happens to communities in the future is, for the cultural naturalist, a matter of
human purposive will. "Abundance" or lack thereof is itself defined by communities and depends
167

Keynes, John Maynard. Economic Possibilities for Our Grandchildren. Yale University,
www.econ.yale.edu/smith/econ116a/keynes1.pdf.

91
on what purposes communities agree upon, i.e. what is agreed to be sacred. What ideals are
driving Keynes' technological society of abundance? Where is meaning communicated and a
moral landscape inhabited? How can a community function ethically if it is assumed that desires
are naturally insatiable? What Keynes leaves out is the possibility that his assumptions regarding
the meaning of material abundance are culturally and historically contingent and therefore
misguided. The assumption is that before our technologically driven quest for abundance, life
must have lacked meaning and must have been nasty, brutish and short.
I believe that Keynes has left out any kind of human mythos, or narrative, that is not
accounted for by the implicit and explicit goals of modern economic practice. It is possible to
inhabit spaces of material abundance that are still bereft of deep, felt significance. Meaning is
just as important as the efficient production of food. It is just as real and just as natural. To
suggest otherwise is to separate human activities from our reflections on the purpose of those
activities, and this is what Keynes does. Keynes presents a caricature of the modern working
person and calls this caricature "Adam." He aptly notices this character's compulsive habit to
work and suggests that this work-instinct ought to be outgrown and surpassed in the near future.
Keynes blithely reminds us that the "Adams" of the world will continue to work vigorously on
arbitrary projects that are no longer necessary for our prosperity. What has just been described,
whether knowingly or unknowingly, is rationalization and our subservience to the Market deity
since there is no established end of our activity outside of the methodical pursuit of material
abundance.
Many readers of Keynes' article will, and have, undoubtedly asked themselves what on
earth their purpose was in working so hard. Weber asked exactly that question in The Protestant
Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism." Looking back, what did their acting out the spirit of
capitalism achieve? The answer "material prosperity for future generations" rings empty and
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hollow. What significant narrative form, or mythos, does this provide for the beleaguered,
compulsive capitalist or worker? What means and ends are experienced as indispensably
valuable? Keynes constantly uses the term "progress" to describe the growth of the Market.
Material prosperity is the measure of meaning.
Of course, "meaning" is actively had and undergone by the live creature before we ever
encounter a problematic situation wherein we must examine the purpose of our symbolic
structures in reflection. But there needs be some narrative that provides meaningful relations in
reflection of what we are engaging in. Lack of such a meaningful narrative blocks our ability to
flourish, thus also our ability to interpret ourselves and our environments. Keynes most
obviously provides an inadequate narrative in which to place our lives. Human beings, according
to his narrative, seem to be conduits (a mere means) whose purpose is the promotion of material
prosperity.
The contrast between Keynes' Weltanschauung and what is expressed by Giovanni
Gentile's Doctrine of Fascism is so enormous that it should demand our attention. Gentile
subscribed to a kind of idealism that rejected the entire liberal empiricist philosophical tradition.
He can be understood as part of a general historical reaction against the liberal and materialist
philosophical movement. Every use of the term "liberalism" in Gentile's work could be replaced
by "Keynesianism," and the work would have the same intended effect.168 Gentile suggests that
collective suicide is preferable to inhabiting Keynes' world. This civilizational suicide is labeled
"heroic."169 Fascism, in my view, is largely an incoherent, violent, indeed suicidal, reaction
against the Market religion because this religion does not provide any wider purpose. The

168

Mussolini, Benito, and Giovanni Gentile. The Doctrine of Fascism. Place of Publication Not Identified: Zhingoora
Books, 2018.
169
Eco, Umberto. "Ur-Fascism." The New York Review of Books. June 22, 1995. Accessed September 2018.

93
Doctrine of Fascism uses the notion of "liberalism" as a foil in contrast with its own ideal. Gentile
refutes every tenet of rationalization and the Market religion, but retreats to brute conflict, or
cultural "struggle," as the only true reality.170 The emphasis on struggle is a mask for what
Emile Durkheim described as "anomie" in his work Suicide.171 Rationalization is a practice that
furthers anomie. The annihilation of social bonds that provide moral guidance and a unified
sense of self and purpose, is anomie. Gentile's fascism emerged from anomie, and the state's
characteristic response to anomie-through-rationalization, has historically been self-annihilation,
and Gentile's fascism is no exception. This is because of the absence of community and a strong
sense of identity that emerges from anomie. The state itself then seeks to fill the narrativevacuum
with its doctrine of the value of so-called "struggle."
Could Gentile and Keynes have a meaningful conversation? The cultural naturalist would
insist that they ought to. Intelligent behavior is defined by the ability to communicate and find
common purposes through the interpenetrating exchange of active, participatory, open dialogue.
To abandon communication is to abandon intelligence; to abandon intelligence is, at least for
human creatures, to embrace violence as the only form of expression left available. The fact that
the Market religion is bereft of legitimacy can be found in the fact that it does not engage in
dialogue with its detractors, and many who embody the Market faith have, to some extent,
known this enough to employ violence as their primary mode of expression and persuasion. The
general dismal of the poor, and the violent acts committed against socialist groups, provide
examples of this. If tribal or nomadic life is not efficiently productive and "profitable" then it has
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no raison d'etre.172 These nomads or tribesman ought to be brought within the Market's liturgical
year, persuaded by its high priests, and begin to conceive of themselves in relation to Market
symbols.173
One last illustration of the deleterious effects of rationalization and subservience to the
Market God can be found in T.W. Arnold's book The Folklore of Capitalism (1937). Arnold, an
economic institutionalist and legal realist, wrote this work during the Great Depression as a
response to the fanatical, unproductive zeal that surrounded him. Some of Arnold's complaints
can also be found in John Dewey's Individualism Old and New, but Arnold is remarkably
specific in his diagnosis of peculiarly modern superstitions.174 For one thing, he points to the
strange fact that market theology is usually
studied apart from the living organizations which profess it as a creed. If it is found to be good our
troubles must come from a sinful refusal to follow Capitalism logically. If it is found to be bad our
troubles are the result of not voluntarily abandoning it. Such a point of view makes it impossible
to observe how creeds actually operate in the world of temporal affairs. It leads only to pounding
the table and preaching the evils of sin. This chapter will therefore be based on the assumption that
social creeds, law, economics, and so on have no meaning whatever apart from the organization to
which they are attached. To say that the organizations voluntarily choose them is as meaningless
as to say that the Catholic Church voluntarily chose the Catholic religion in preference to
Protestantism.175

It is sufficiently obvious that Arnold views our Market system as a social creed and explicitly
compares it with the Catholic religion. The defenders of the Market faith, during Arnold's time as
well as our own, treat the Market as an ideal ethical system that mere mortals may never see
actualized.176 He goes on to say that "the notion that men obtain a creed, either through the
exercise of pure reason or from some other superhuman power, is so firmly fixed in popular and
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scholarly thinking about government because it is the essence of all worship, and of all
religion...Nothing disturbs the attitude of religious worship so much as a few practical
observations. And yet that spiritual need is something which cannot be denied to any group of
men, not even to scientists.177" The problem is that an untested and unexamined faith can begin
to reveal horrific consequences and it becomes necessary to put it to question.
Arnold believes that the Businessman has become a mythological character and that we
now compare all other social roles with this central role. The

American Businessman was independent of his fellows. No individual could rule him. Hence the
'rule of law above men' was symbolized by the Constitution. This meant that the American
Businessman was an individual who was free from the control of any other individual and owed
allegiance only to the Constitution. However, he was the only individual entitled to this kind of
freedom. His employees were subject to the arbitrary control of this divinity. Their only freedom
consisted in the supposed opportunity of laborers to become American businessman themselves."

Arnold goes on to argue throughout his work that the independent, individual businessman no
longer exists as a social reality but that the modern world continues to treat it as a matter of
religious importance that this individual does exist. We have anthropomorphized the Market in
similar fashion, and the Market's devilish mythological counterpart is "governmental
interference."178 Such protagonists and antagonists are mythological characters of religious
significance but now have little bearing on addressing concrete problems involving social
association. This mythological Businessman is rationalization par excellence. He or she is
isolated, self-sufficient, and responsible only to an abstract document the contents of which are
equally, if not more, abstract, and amenable to theological interpretation. Reinterpretation is so
uncommon because "nothing seems clearer than that the attitudes of any given ruling class are so
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set that all arguments in the world will not change them."179 My account of communication
amends this by suggesting that the task of changing these attitudes is made all the more difficult
by ruling classes.
The Market religion pervades contemporary life because "smaller institutions always
follow the pattern of the larger ones."180 He found that "Yale was doing what it could to search
for truth in the same organized efficient way in which the United States Steel Corporation made
steel."181 Yale University was "tempered and molded by the great overshadowing divinity, the
American Businessman."182 Arnold's thesis is remarkably similar to Harvey Cox's. The Market
God or mythological Businessman are religions in their own right, and these theologies leave us
ill-equipped to cope with real problems. Cox was correct to emphasize that the Market God is
fraudulent because it delivers nothing that it promises. These mythologized economic entities
promise fulfilling lives by providing purpose. But the market faith provides no way to respond to
the Great Depression. This faith can only suggest that the Market's tenets were somehow
betrayed.
The American experience of the Great Depression provides as dramatic an example of
the failures of the market faith as anyone could ask for. Enormous economic and political
institutions simply refused to face the practical realities confronted by the American people
because to do so would be an affront to the Market God and the principles associated with this
free-market faith.183 "Mystical attacks on practical measures achieved an astonishing degree of
success.184" Slogans were recited to ensure the people's faith regardless of whether or not these
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theological tenets provided for basic needs and the necessary practical reforms. Attempts at
reform were constantly lambasted as deviations from sound economic "principles" or "laws."
What should be an earnest, scientific, activity became, due to the long history of rationalization
that has been described, a theology demanding our faith.
The era of the Great Depression presented an environment where "the only class which
was permitted to think objectively about what it was doing without violating its own creed was
big business. In this area both learned and popular philosophy proved that whatever mistakes
business made canceled each other, that its greed was only a form of unselfishness, and that its
corruption was only the work of an occasional emissary of Satan sent up from below to plague
mankind.”185 The Market faith defines good and bad in terms of quantifiable values, and business
practices were not in conflict with this. Mandeville, Hobbes, and a vast array of other thinkers of
that era set in motion a social order that saw the apotheosis of the mythological Businessman.
"The terms Communism and Fascism are used to denounce these new organizations as breeders
of heresy. The acceptance of the slogans of Capitalism as tools rather than as truths is still over
the horizon.”186 The aptly used idea of "heresy" in the sense just used is not conducive to
identifying problems and employing effective dialogue to achieve some kind of social
intelligence.
The religiosity of the Market's practitioners can also be demonstrated by using another
one of Arnold's examples. These examples are telling because they are matters of life and death.
The remedy for fever established by the time (the Medieval period) was the art of bleeding to rid
the body of those noxious vapors and humors in the blood which were the root of the illness. Of
course, patients sickened and died in the process, but they were dying for a medical principle, so it
was thoroughly worth-while. To depart from that principle would have the same effect on human
health as the failure to shoot strikers occupying the plant of an industrial concern in a sit-down
strike...187
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The strikers are shot out of devotion to an internally consistent set of religious ideals. The Market
cannot have these kinds of externalities. Economists can only regret "man's tendency to follow
false economic reasoning, just as the preachers regretted man's tendency to sin. Nevertheless,
they felt that the only refuge was in a deeper search for the Word and in more fervent
preaching."188 This has been the general reaction of social policy makers since the early
seventeenth-century. Attitudes have changed to some extent, but recent articles like the one that
will be examined next, still show that this religious impulse has not subsided.
A popular economics article titled “Brain-Focused Economics: More Than Just
Comparative Advantage” (2018) demonstrates that we still practice rationalization and are
largely subservient to the Market deity. Richard B. McKenzie takes the seemingly radical
position that traditional neoclassical economists are wrong when they assume that individuals
involved with free-trade are perfectly rational. McKenzie writes that
In real-world markets inhabited by decision makers who have evolved flawed mental resources
and thinking processes, competitive market forces can reduce decision-making flaws and thus
lower production costs and raise real incomes by more than conventional economists have
heretofore claimed. Flawed decision makers are led by competitive pressures, as if by an “invisible
hand,” toward (not to) improved (not perfect) decision heuristics that, when adopted—even
grudgingly—add to the otherwise achievable gains from trade.189

What McKenzie provides throughout the article is a full-fledged definition of rationality. The
market functions to "help to overcome innate flaws in people’s thinking, leading to greater cost
saving, efficiency, and welfare."190 McKenzie criticizes the conventional economic idea of
perfect rationality in favor of improving and honing market rationality, since cognitive science
188
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and behavioral economics have dispelled the usefulness of perfect rationality as a standard for
human behavior. McKenzie claims (and I agree in a practical sense) that "with conventional
economic theories grounded in perfect rationality, there is no way markets (or any other
institutional setting) can improve (or worsen) the brain’s allocation of its own resources and
decision making."191 What is interesting is that the abandonment of an ideal, perfect, standard of
rationality does not lead McKenzie to abandon reductionism, but to accommodate the acceptance
of contingency and a scientifically informed view of mind to the long tradition of Market
rationalization.
Evolutionary biology is brought into McKenzie's analysis as the background within
which Market cost-benefit analysis is understood. The arbitrary division between nature and
culture functions to demand that we either prioritize the tradition of rationalization and the
Market faith as a cultural institution or we simply acquiesce to the pure facts of scientific
observation and abandon our sacred symbols and start over completely. McKenzie chooses to use
Market rationalization as an ethical ideal to which flawed human nature must comport itself. The
division between nature and culture has an insidious, insoluble effect. The Market, even
considering McKenzie's rejection of perfect rationality, presents us with a transcendent ideal
which conflicts almost immediately with our natural "decision-making flaws." Our only recourse
becomes the constant practical advocacy of the transcendent Market faith which our human
nature must serve, despite its flaws. If this sounds familiar, that is because it is a curious variation
on the theme of Christian theology.
The purpose of rationality is not open to possibility as such in McKenzie's account.
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Instead, intelligence is in service to cost-benefit analysis as a fixed end. I have stated before that
the condition for the practice of ethics requires radical, creative openness to possibility in
reflection. Fanaticism breeds within environments where articles of faith are not recognized as
faiths in the first place. No clear distinction is made in this article between scientific economic
principles and the conclusions of natural science, and the two branches of inquiry are treated as
partners working toward a similar goal, i.e. material prosperity. It is insisted throughout the
article that the competitive Market improves our rationality. Logically, this is equivalent to
suggesting that praying to the Holy Spirit is a mere means to improve our faith, but the purpose
of the Market faith is clearly material prosperity as an end-in-itself.
I do not arbitrarily focus on Richard B. McKenzie as though his essay were some special,
peculiar instance of proselytizing the Market faith. His article merely stood out as an applicable
example of what is generally assumed in economics. It is to his credit that he discredits "perfect
rationality," but it is more than a little peculiar that the whole standard is not abandoned
altogether, but a kind of economic Calvinism is advocated instead. He reminds us that despite
our inability to live up to our own symbolic constructions "improvement [of our powers of
ratiocination] is not only possible but almost assured.192" The brain "allocates its resources,"
which are "scarce." It is telling that economic metaphors are used to describe the activities of the
mind. We must accept our fallen nature in the face of the almighty demands of the free-market.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION: HOPE FOR THE FUTURE
Our thinking about symbols of money and credit seldom takes such a fact-minded point of view. Here we are
caught in formulas which pretend to be universal truths. We believe in the capitalistic system, as we used to believe
in democracy, not as a tool, but as a set of abstract principles to be followed. The systems of government over which
we have our theological disputes are no longer monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy, but Capitalism, Communism,
and Fascism. Capitalism is a good thing in the abstract. It has its following of learned men and philosophers. It is
no more descriptive of social organization today than the theology of the monarchy was descriptive before the
French Revolution.193

The sheer capacity to symbolically reduce everything to an economic value shows how
entrenched the Market faith is. Little competition exists to counter this worldview. Resistance has
emerged sporadically for centuries in Marxian, religious, or traditionalist forms. The secret of the
Market faith's success probably lies in the fact that it is more flexible than older forms of
association. The Market faith seems to provide practical results to a degree, but these positive
outcomes are all too often reserved for a few. This faith's progress is measurable, since we can see
that our material wealth and ability to control how we attain that wealth has continually increased
since the abandonment of the Aristotelian ethical tradition. The general unwillingness to examine
the full implications of our economic ends-in-view has led to a situation wherein mere means are
elevated to the status of resolute, immobile, fixed ends.
Dewey was correct to focus on criticizing the many fundamental dualisms that we rely
upon in theory and in practical life. The division between "nature" and "culture" is especially
significant. Rationalization would not be possible, and the Market faith could not be practiced, if
the metaphysical and epistemological division between these two categories collapsed. The
separation of human purposes from natural phenomena has encouraged a situation that demands
form be imposed from without upon an often unwilling universe. The impetus toward idealistic
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philosophy most certainly stems from this situation which is jarring, alienating, and disturbing in
a fundamental manner. It is my view that the Market faith has been universalized, relied upon,
and allowed to define rationality, largely because we do not really want to allow a total
separation between a mechanical, deterministic "nature" and our beloved purposes. A total
separation cannot occur because the separation is a false one. Modernity and the Enlightenment
project extended the application of Market principles because, one way or another, we had to
enact our ethical purposes. This was cleverly accomplished by treating these ethical purposes as
universal laws, tendencies, standards or, in more recent years as pure, normativity free "facts."
It is often said today that the Market deity allowed for, or somehow even created the
scientific advancements that we now enjoy.
It is a great mistake to suppose that our mechanical inventions of machines and implements-- the
steam engine, the telegraph, the telephone, the motor car, and the other agencies of production and
distribution-- are the actual fruit of the present industrial order. On the contrary, they are the fruit
of the discoveries of a comparatively small number of scientific men who have not labored for
recognition and who have never got it, very much at least, in the way of pecuniary recognition.194

This passage emphasizes a great tragic consequence of the Market faith; the elimination of our
recognition of human will from life. That "small number of scientific men" opened up what is
possible in our experience, but the mask of mechanical determinism prevents the true import and
value of their efforts from being acknowledged. A sense of meaninglessness will undoubtedly
accompany a faith that separates nature and culture as well as facts and values. The humanity of
the scientist and the ideals held by scientists, and by all those who seek to know, are consistently
eroded when it is held that what they feel, think, and want to pursue in relation to the observed
facts are not "natural" realities but "cultural" figments. The scientist or economist today purports
to have access to a special realm of "facts" through the use of technical languages generally
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inaccessible to plebeians uninitiated in these arts. In fact, scientists and economists are simply
"initiated" by being made aware of a set of problems that have developed a vocabulary historically
for contending with these problems. These problems are actually communal and cannot be truly
segregated from the rest of the community because solutions have consequences.
"...We have had production and distribution organized on a non-social basis-- a basis of
pecuniary profit. And when they suddenly had to be switched over to the basis of public need
and public service, they naturally broke down. The great inefficiency here is, however, the
failure to utilize human power."195 My addition to Dewey's insight is that this "non-social basis"
of pecuniary profit has been a theological position that has gripped our imagination to such an
extent that its guides our general view of what intelligence itself is. Dewey states in a different
essay that "we are always possessed by habits and customs, and this fact signifies that we are
always influenced by the inertia and the momentum of forces temporarily outgrown but
nevertheless still present with us as part of our being...But change is also with us and demands
the constant remaking of old habits and old ways of thinking, desiring and acting.196" The issue is
that the Market faith suspends the development of new ways of "thinking, desiring and acting."
We desire, think and act within the context of the fundamentally important concept of scarcity
mediated throughout by free-market, "non-social" forces.
Dewey believed fervently that our "mechanical forces of production" have been
employed for the sake of accumulation as an end in itself and that this "is the cause of the
continually growing social chaos and strife.197" I have tried to stress with Dewey that we cannot
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simply preach "to individuals that they should place spiritual ends above material means. It can
be brought about by organized social reconstruction that puts the results of the mechanism of
abundance at the free disposal of individuals."211 Curiously enough, Catholic social teaching has
a long tradition of being in agreement with Dewey on this point. St. Thomas Moore made the
same criticism regarding the prevalence of beggars and thieves in the seventeenth century.198 The
Jesuit economist Heinrich Pesch makes similar claims in Ethics and the National Economy.
So much of my own hope for the future rests on a Deweyan foundation further
supplemented by the many crucially important ideas put forward by Alasdair MacIntyre. Thomas
Alexander has promoted the notion that Dewey formed a "conversational teleology," (which was
examined earlier in this work) and MacIntyre has situated our circumstances historically.
MacIntyre provides us with a desperately needed narrative of where we stand historically and
what that means, thus providing further context to Dewey's analyses of how to flourish in
meaningful communion. MacIntyre calls for nothing less than the reconstruction of teleological,
communally agreed upon, moral practices and the vocabulary to express those practices.199 I
agree that pluralism without a common moral language, which entails the inability to genuinely
persuade or dissuade others of moral claims, is not illustrative of genuine community but of a
kind of warfare often waged by means other than open violence. Dewey points us to our shared,
purposive, experience of the world as the basis for this reconstructive project.
The reconstruction of communities informed by a shared practice of purposive, i.e.
teleological, virtues requires experimentalism in moral theory. "Reflective morality demands
observation of particular situations, rather than fixed adherence to a priori principles...it is, in
short, the method of democracy, of a positive toleration which amounts to sympathetic regard for
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the intelligence and personality of others, even if they hold views opposed to ours, and of
scientific inquiry into facts and testing of ideas.”200 The method best exemplified by the practice
of rationalization and devotion to the Market deity is utterly opposed to experimentalism in
moral theory because it is
the method of appeal to authority and to precedent. The will of divine beings, supernaturally
revealed; of divinely ordained rulers; of so-called natural law, philosophically interpreted; of
private conscience; of the commands of the state; or the constitution; of common consent; of a
majority; of received conventions; of traditions coming from a hoary past; of the wisdom of
ancestors; of precedents set up in the past; have at different times been the authority appealed to.
The common feature of the appeal is that there is some voice so authoritative as to preclude the
need of inquiry.201

The encouragement of experientialism in moral theory could be encouraged by simply accepting
and teaching the true significance of what happened in Europe during the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries. Textbooks in high schools and colleges usually present a naive picture of
"progress." This semi-fictional glossing over of history only prolongs and deepens scars that
reach into our being. Moreover, historical revisionism of this magnitude hides from us what the
problems that beset us are. It requires intellectual figures like MacIntyre to show us what our
narrative is and what the consequences of its abandonment are. Dewey is not suggesting that we
neglect history when he advocates experimentalism. In fact, we must know what happened, at
least broadly, if we are to behave in an intelligent way. The results of past experiments must be
known. Obstruction of historical knowledge, especially historical trauma, usually manifests as
delusional and destructive behavior.
This work has partly been an attempt to illustrate a cultural narrative and the potential
role that Dewey's thought could play in addressing the pressing crises involved in this embodied,
historical narrative. Rationalization has been defined as the remaking of society in accord with
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abstract reason through the replacement of custom and tradition and thus also the removal of
social roles preserved by custom and tradition. Rationalization is a habitual, cultural practice in
the Deweyan sense of "habit." It is not like Geist moving us toward an ideal state of
selfactualization, knowledge or freedom. Dewey redefines many of our most central concepts so
that we stand a chance of reorienting ourselves to one another and to the wider environment in
such a way that our crises can be addressed. First, "truth" is never a noun that is possessed by
economists, or the Market, or any inquirer. Truth is a practice of engagement with persons and
things, i.e., experimentally testing ideas. It would be more accurate to say that "she is going out
truthing today" rather than to say that "she has just now acquired a truth," as though conclusions
can be eternally held. This observation places meaning and artistic engagement at the center of
human life and moves the practice of verifying propositions closer to the periphery. Dewey was
given an opportunity to respond to his critics near the end of his life in his Library of Living
Philosophers volume. I think that he seems ever so slightly exasperated, no doubt because the
habits of reflection he spent his life criticizing are so deeply engrained that his critics would
sometimes implicitly rely on those assumptions when confronting Dewey's ideas.
I have concentrated on the Market religion, so it would be fruitful to address what Dewey
thought about God, faith, and hope. His work A Common Faith addresses these questions in a
deeply compelling manner. My view is that the central problem pertaining to faith, hope, and
God has to do with the relationship between, and the metaphysical statuses of, possibility and
actuality. Ideals, which are possibilities that can bring about action, have sometimes been treated
in the Western philosophical tradition as subjective constructions of the imagination. Possibilities
are therefore not "real" but are instead fanciful mental constructions. Common parlance shows
that "subjective delusions" and "subjective ideals" have such a close epistemic relation because
of the enormous epistemic gap artificially constructed between the subjective and objective the

107
possible and the actual. Mechanistic determinism is the wholesale denial of possibility, i.e. of the
ideal, in Nature. Ideals that we reflect upon when implementing a plan for what we ought to do
are therefore, according to the deterministic position, not indications of the existence of genuine
possibility. It's as though the phenomena that we perceive seem to include possibility, but
noumenal reality (which includes the human agent) is antecedently determined mechanically.
These deterministic theories substitute lived-experience with a philosophical conclusion that is a
universal claim and serves as the basic assumption underlying all subsequent inquiry.
The denial of the deterministic position involves the recognition that possibility is real, i.e.
natural. "Nature, existence, or 'the Universe' is not just what actually is: it includes all its
possibilities as well."202 Lives can only find fulfillment and meaning if it is recognized that the
actual is not all that there is.
The rise of the Market faith can perhaps be better understood when we realize that the
supposed fruits of "the Market" are almost immediately tangible, corporeal, verifiable and
measurable. The Markets ideals are close to hand (or close to being actual) because the Market is
given credit for providing us with our material abundance. Little faith is required to trust a deity
that supposedly provides quick material prosperity. The issue is that the promise of material
abundance is precisely as far as this faith will ever take the believer. This faith provides what
Max Weber thought was the highly rational pursuit of wholly irrational ends. It is a faith devoted
to acquiring satisfaction from external goods at the exclusion of internal goods.203
I worry that the Enlightenment project, which is practiced rationalization, has implanted
itself even into how we understand religious institutions and religious experience. The Catholic
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faith, for example, is not a sack full of epistemically "justified true beliefs." "Subject knows
proposition" epistemologies threaten to strip the legitimacy of the religious from our lived
experience. These philosophical approaches which focus intently on epistemology as the central
issue create a situation in which theists, and other spiritually minded individuals, cannot hope to
defend their whole orientation toward life. But the advantage possessed by the Catholic faith
over the Market faith, for example, lies in its constant focus on viewing the actual in the light of
the possible.204
The atheists of Dewey's time felt betrayed by A Common Faith. A new definition of God
is given in this work, and Dewey shows no sympathy for militant, deterministic, materialist
atheism. Of course, he also has no sympathy for absolutist religious dogma.
The three crucial themes Dewey presents in A Common Faith are: (1) the distinction between
religions and "the religious" as a form of experience, (2) the idea of God as the creative
intersection of the ideal or possible and the real or actual, and (3) the infusion of the religious as a
pervasive mode of experience into democratic life. Insofar as the "Abrahamic" religions of
Judaism, Christianity, and Islam have defined themselves by sets of theological dogmas about the
world, they have been challenged by modern science as well as by other religions with dogmas of
their own. If by "religions" one means "beliefs," religions conflict not only with science but also
with each other."205

These concerns indicate Dewey's central purpose of eradicating the habitual belief that man
exists in isolation. The Market faith would disintegrate into oblivion if cultures accepted that "a
religious attitude, however, needs the sense of a connection of man, in the way of both
dependence and support, with the enveloping world that the imagination feels is the universe.”206
This disintegration would occur because the Market religion requires "isolated man's" desire for
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power, domination and control generally devoid of the sense of wonder (openness to possibility)
characteristic of a properly religious attitude.
The "religious" is described by Dewey as a distinct form of experience. Some changes in
our ourselves are deep seated and profound.
"They relate not to this and that want in relation to this and that condition of our surroundings, but
pertain to our being in its entirety. Because of their scope, this modification of ourselves enduring.
It lasts through any amount of vicissitudes of circumstances, internal and external. There is a
composing and harmonizing of the various elements of our being such that, in spite of changes in
the special conditions that surround us, these conditions are also arranged, settled, in relation to
us.
This attitude includes a note of submission. But it is voluntary, not externally imposed; and as
voluntary it is something more than a mere Stoical resolution to endure unperturbed throughout
the buffetings of fortune. It is more outgoing, more ready and glad, than the latter attitude, and it is
more active than the former. And in calling it voluntary, it is not meant that it depends upon a
particular resolve or volition. It is a change of will conceived as the organic plenitude of our being,
rather than any special change in will.221

I believe that this passage describes not only the form of religious experience, but also
that change that drives individuals to practice philosophy. My grave concern with the Market faith
can ultimately be summarized as the worry that we will begin to account only for "this and that
want in relation to this and that condition of our surroundings." Religious experience needs to be
expressed through artistic practice in a way that Market worship could not conceivably allow.
That light of wonder which compels us to wander out of Plato's cave and to incorporate into our
being the mystery that is found into our fundamental attitudes is constantly in danger of being
extinguished further by rationalization.
The religious form of experience is not individualistic as it might seem from the passage
just quoted. A social arrangement is fully capable of stifling or encouraging the artistic
expression of "the religious." I go further and emphasize that we understand our religious
experience through our engagements with others. The idea of the "universal" or the "whole" is
not a factual idea that can be verified in experience. It is an ideal, or imaginative projection.207
This projection depends very much on social interaction. If the whole of cultural life is stripped
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down to deterministic market relations, laws, or tendencies, then what does this open up for us
imaginatively as individuals and communities?
The imagination is fundamentally important for any cultural naturalist. First, we accept
the reality of possibility in nature. Second, our ends are possibilities reflected upon. Third, the
imagination compares, contrasts, and imagines the consequences of, these ideal possibilities. The
activity of imagination is where ethical decision-making occurs. I do not mean to imply that the
imagination is a separate faculty in a Kantian sense; thinking imaginatively is active just as other
undertakings such as sex or eating are active. All of these activities are processes of being-intheworld.
Dewey is trying to rehabilitate us to the sacred, but I am arguing that this cannot happen
on a large scale while we fail to grasp the historical development of rationalization, its
culmination in the Market, and how all this operates in our daily lives. The sacred requires a
meaningful cultural narrative. An alternative could be a reliance on an anti-social Nietzschean
solution which depends upon the power of the Ubermensch to save us through sheer force of
individual will. I reject this prima facie as contrary to the philosophical, empirical, and social
premises for which I have argued.
Cultural naturalism conceives of artistic practice as not just a "way of life" but as
descriptive of meaningful expression in life in general. The practice of rationalization has artistic
elements, but it obscures and diverts energies and experiences to such an extent that much of
life's potentialities are forgotten or not conceived of. This is due to the splicing of experiences
that could otherwise have been consummatory into quantitative segments put to use as means for
equally quantified ends. Why would one value being personally entangled in a culture in which
personal cultivation of virtue is not necessary for justice? In other words, how does one locate
the value of their purposes in a social environment that is conceived of as indifferent to our
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purposes? Wherein lies purpose and meaningful expression without a common good which
arises organically from cooperative social interaction?
Hope is found in the educative capacity to enrich one another's lives through the
identification of common problems, community building, and the identification of sacred
practices through social artistic expression. "Unlike the path to the enveloping whole through
philosophic reflection, art, and nature lead us there through immediate experience...consecutive
reasoning is less a guide to wisdom than are imagination and sensitivity to the ineffable.”208 I
would add two things to this valuable insight. First, the term "immediate" should be taken as
merely descriptive of a peculiarly modern dualism rather than as our fixed epistemic
predicament.
Second, "imagination and sensitivity to the ineffable" is a social project.
Precariousness, that generic trait of existence, certainly offers hope. Projects, such as the
Market religion, that seek to create a static, wholly determinate, quantified set of social
conditions will no doubt be transformed thanks to the impossibility of permanent stasis in
experience. Problems are perhaps already revealing themselves that the Market could not hope to
solve. Significant change may be a necessity in the near future. The Market religion may
collapse for a reason similar to why feudalism collapsed. As Tawney writes, "The feudal
intellectual order's obstinate refusal to revise old formulae in the light of new facts exposed them
helpless to a counter-attack, in which the whole fabric of their philosophy, truth and fantasy
alike, was overwhelmed together. They despised knowledge, and knowledge destroyed them.”209
It is certainly true that many of the high priests of economics and much of the general laity
simply cannot conceive of there being any problem with the market religion, despite the constant
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violent reactions against it. It is implied that rationalization just isn't complete yet, but that these
disembodied abstract principles of reason will be victorious in the ideal future. This is the kind of
superstitious thinking that indicates a retreat from the realities of the world and the actual state of
affairs. Charles S. Peirce would no doubt see this as the “method of tenacity” in practice.
I would like to launch a vociferous defense of pragmatic, naturalistic, communitycentered
Catholicism, but this is such a large and contentious topic that it should be reserved for a
different work. I will suggest that if Catholicism abandoned many of the standards imposed upon
it by the Enlightenment and rationalized modernity, then it could begin to express itself as the
embodied, lived, practice of sacred virtues as demonstrated through Christ. Catholicism is more
Deweyan than one might expect: both pragmatists and Catholics concentrate intently on the
desire to build harmonious communities that allow peoples to flourish. A shared emphasis is also
placed upon shared communal practices rather than mere shared beliefs.
My own personal experience of Catholicism was partially responsible for my love and
admiration for Dewey's philosophy. I am Catholic with or without stating that the specific
epistemic claims of the Church regarding the metaphysical statuses of the angels, demons, and
other supernatural entities are "justified true beliefs" or "verifiable propositions." A similar
circumstance pertains to the Market religion, only the influence is largely negative. I can deny
most, if not all, of the propositions put forward by the Catechisms of the Market faith, but I still
live in situations fully mediated by Market relations. Hope can be grasped when we become
conscious of the symbols that hold sway in our lives. This requires introspection,
communication, and deep concern for one another.
I find that another source of hope comes from an unlikely source, that source being
sensual passion and physical interaction. I depart from the usual Catholic stance on this issue.
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Aquinas generally condemns sensual excitement as temptation to sin.210 Universal principles of
abstract reason have a very difficult time reaching the private, personal realm of physical
intimacy and connection (although it is possible). I agree with Dewey scholar Richard
Shusterman in that the body is “more basic than ink, paint, or brushes, than violins or drums,
than wood and stone, the human body is the primary instrument for making art. And it is also the
primal, indispensable medium for perceiving art.”211 Human beings can communicate
meaningfully in a physical way even without any other "instrument for making art."
Even when confronted by situations devoid of immediately perceivable meaning, human
beings can come to see the other as meaningful. The scaffolding that always opens the social
world to possibility is the capacity to find meaning in the other no matter the limitations in
mutual symbolic understanding. The bare essentials that potentially compose meaningful
experience will never fully dissipate. I emphasize physical communication because the
conditions for meaningful experience are available to live creatures even without mutually
understood symbolic communication. Symbolic meaning can be constructed organically through
the most basic of social interactions because we are not separated from nature. These basic points
give reason to hope because the problem of meaning and fulfillment is never a lost cause. As
Alexander writes,
The world of the twenty-first century faces what may be the ultimate challenge in the survival of
many species (including our own). In addition, we face the explosion of the human population,
possibly beyond sustainable numbers, and the development of an intimate worldwide electronic
culture of corporate consumerism. The civilization of modernity, now exported around the globe,
carries with it its inherited dichotomies. These must be critiqued. Not only does this require an
exploration of the negative consequences of certain assumptions, but an historical understanding
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of how those assumptions were generated and how they evolved. To critique the present, we must
understand its historical genesis, especially in terms of the interplay of metaphysical commitments
and social legitimation. Worldviews are narratives that empower212

The Market faith is no longer a worldview (or narrative) that empowers. It has become a
belief system that attempts to limit practically and theoretically our ability to identify our common
problems and establish a common good. Our conception of common goods are thoroughly
mediated by Market concepts and relations. These relations are understood as facts rather than as
ethical postulates. These facts are touted in an ahistorical manner. Economic texts usually remove
their formulae from the concrete historical problems that these formulae were created to solve.
What is more, these economic formulae were natural outgrowths of more general philosophies. I
have tried to show that this whole process is a tragic historical narrative and not a naive account
of "progress." I call this historic narrative "tragic" because our "narrative" itself was lost in the
process. This is a consequence of asserting that we now have objective laws of abstract reason
that are independent from our embodied cultural life. We are just as alienated from objective
economic laws as we are from the laws of physics.
We inhabit a cultural space where the attachment of the word "science" to any activity
provides that activity with an immediate legitimacy that compels us to action. This use of the
word "science" is more in accord with what Charles S. Peirce called the "method of tenacity"
than the "method of science.213" Science can easily be perverted to mean "unquestionable
because the conclusion is a measurable quantity." Science is meant to open up possibilities for
whole communities by consciously engaging with the way things interact. Scientific conclusions
are not separable from the purposes that drive scientific investigation. Scientific conclusions
should inform us and help us modify our purposes in light of what we find.
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It is my suspicion that much of the inflexibility that we find in economic theory is
explainable in terms of the discipline's desire to justify itself as a "science." The conception of
science being used is a faulty one for the reasons just given. There is constant pressure put on
economics for results, so much so that merely entertaining the notion that foundational economic
concepts are wrong is terrifying because this threatens economists' ability to demonstrate
political results. Political agents often rely on the Market faith as the standard of their own
success or failure. They use economic jargon that usually does not reflect the real problems that
communities face.
What we need is nothing less than a new democratic ethical vocabulary that is
teleologically open. We need to provide educations that present realistic narratives that are based
on historical reality. The magical and ahistorical thinking characteristic of the Market faith
cannot thrive when individuals are aware of a historical narrative. Much of our present thinking
is the residue of an ancient ontological hierarchy in which each thing had its natural place and
purpose. The Market deity has taken up residence at the top of this old hierarchy, but we do not
use the ancient vocabulary to describe it. It is a strange and destructive synthesis of feudal and
Enlightenment ideals. It can be described as a metaphysical hierarchy devoid of the old telos that
gave each thing its proper end.
I have argued that orthodox economics is a contemporary religion and that rationalization
is the practice of this religion. My use of historical and contemporary sources places this claim in
a real context. It would have been contrary to cultural naturalism to neglect this context. I have
provided a narrative, and the effectiveness of this narrative is what is up for debate. The claim
that economists no longer universally subscribe to a "free" market ideology is not a refutation of
my thesis, regardless of whether that is true. What is under discussion is a centuries-old historical
faith. The consequences of abandoning this faith need to be explored and seriously considered. I
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believe that communities just might abandon the Market faith as a condition for solving their
practical problems. If a problem has a solution but it is not considered appropriate by the market
system, then communities may just abandon that system out of sheer desperation. The trouble is
that the denizens of the Market faith often react violently to those who reject their tenets.
My greatest fear is that the Market faith will suffer a violent demise of some sort.
Intelligent social action is the opposite of pure reaction. Intelligence demands that we employ
some means of transitioning away from a Market faith and toward an ethic that centers itself on
communal flourishing. If communities began to view "artistic production" as meaningful activity
that permeates life, instead of a specialty left to isolated experts, then the Market would no
longer have hegemony over deciding what we ought to do. This is because the Market faith
attempts to isolate art (especially fine art) from practical life and so limit our ability to express
ourselves meaningfully. The "rational" assembly line such as the one found in the film
Metropolis(1927) threatens to invade our inner-lives. I think that this form of social association
conflicts so deeply with our human need for meaning that communities will not stand for it in the
long run. My greatest concern isn't whether or not the Market faith will be a casualty of history.
My concern is with how this faith will be laid to rest.
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